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define individual words; they don’t typically define phrases or allow for consideration
of broader linguistic context. And while dictionaries can provide a list of possible
senses, they can’t tell us which sense is the most ordinary (or common).
Originalists have also turned to other methods, but those methods have also fallen
short. But all is not lost. Big data—and the tools of linguists—have the potential to
bring greater rigor and transparency to the practice of originalism. This article will
explore the application of corpus linguistic methodology to aid originalism’s inquiry
into the original communicative content of the Constitution. We propose to improve
this inquiry by use of a newly released corpus (or database) of founding-era texts: the
beta version of the Corpus of Founding-Era American English.
This paper will showcase how typical tools of a corpus—concordance lines,
collocation, clusters (or n-grams), and frequency data—can aid in the search for
original communicative content. We will also show how corpus data can help
determine whether a word or phrase in question is best thought of as an ordinary one
or a legal term of art. To showcase corpus linguistic methodology, this paper will
analyze important clauses in the Constitution that have generated litigation and
controversy over the years (commerce, public use, and natural born citizen) and
another whose original meaning has been presumed to be clear (domestic violence).
We propose best practices, and also discuss the limitations of corpus linguistic
methodology for originalism.
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INTRODUCTION
A threshold inquiry for any problem of interpretation concerns the
“communicative content” of the text. Any attempt to give legal meaning to
the words of the law begins with “linguistic meaning.”1 Sometimes we stop
there. If the communicative content of the law is clear, we give that content
controlling legal significance.2
This is the “standard picture” of interpretation.3 Most of the difficulties
arise in cases where the standard picture is unclear. The divisions among
textualists and purposivists in statutory interpretation, for example, go to the
likelihood of finding ambiguity in the search for communicative content, and
to the proper tools and course for resolving such ambiguity. But everyone
starts at the same place—at communicative content—and ends there if the
standard picture is sufficiently clear.
Constitutional interpretation is no different in this respect. In this field,
we also start with the operative text. And again we end there where the
communicative content of the Constitution is clear.
We may not often end there. We may rarely conclude that the standard
constitutional picture is clear, particularly on questions that get litigated in our
courts. But still this is the starting point. And no one doubts that the standard
picture is sometimes crystal clear. Article II, Section 1 of the United States
Constitution says that no person “who shall not have attained to the Age of
thirty-five Years” is “eligible” to serve as President of the United States.4 No
one who is trying to interpret those words would say that a thirty-year-old is
eligible for the presidency.5 That’s because we can all agree on what it means
1 See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
479, 480 (2013) (distinguishing the “communicative content” of a legal text from its “legal content,”
or in other words “the legal norms the text produces”).
2 There are caveats, of course—like the doctrine of absurdity. But this is the general rule. See
Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the
New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1756–58 (2010) (concluding, based on a comprehensive
study of state court approaches to statutory interpretation, that such courts give primacy to text and
decline to look to external sources of meaning if they find the text “plain,” and asserting that “these
state efforts . . . respond directly to the leading academic proposals advanced to make federal
statutory interpretation more determinate”).
3 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079,
1086 (2017) (speaking of the “standard picture,” or “view that we can explain our legal norms by
pointing to the ordinary communicative content of our legal texts,” or, in other words, “an
instrument’s meaning as a matter of language”); see also id. at 1082 n.2 (borrowing the “standard
picture” terminology from Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and Its Discontents, in 1 OXFORD
STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 39, 48 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011)).
4 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
5 But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Bill Clinton Unconstitutional: The Case for President Strom
Thurmond, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 217, 220 (1996) (presenting a tongue-in-cheek case for the
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to have “attained to the Age of thirty-five Years”; the communicative content
of that proviso is clear in foreclosing the eligibility of anyone younger.
A principal complication for constitutional interpretation, of course, is the
added time dimension.6 Thus, most of the action in the theory of constitutional
interpretation concerns the question of how to deal with the fact that the
Constitution (unlike most operative statutes) was written centuries ago, in a
dialect that is, at least in some respects, unfamiliar to the twenty-first-century
ear. This is the problem of linguistic drift—the notion that language usage and
meaning shifts over time. And this raises the question of which standard picture
to credit: the picture as it would have been viewed at the time of the
Constitution’s founding, or the picture as seen by the modern jurist?
For some constitutional questions, the time difference won’t matter. We
can assume (though this proposition could be tested—more on that below),
for example, that our system for accounting a person’s age has not changed
since the founding of the Constitution. And if so, then a commitment to
following the communicative content of the law should foreclose the
eligibility of our thirty-year-old candidate.7
But of course there are other provisions of the Constitution for which that
would not hold. One example is the Domestic Violence Clause—the
provision in Article IV, Section 4 that provides that “[t]he United States . . .
shall protect” each state in the union “against Invasion” and “on Application
of the Legislature . . . against domestic Violence.”8 This clause is viewed as
having undergone linguistic drift in the relevant timeframe. It apparently
meant insurrection or uprising in the eighteenth century, but “domestic
violence” is understood to refer to an assault against a member of a person’s
household today. This can also be tested; we do so below.
That frames the threshold question for constitutional interpretation.
When the language of the Constitution is understood in one way today but
can be shown to have had a different communicative content historically (at
its adoption), which is the relevant standard picture? If a state legislature
proposition that the age standard in Article II should be allowed to evolve over time; asserting that
“[m]aturity is the key, as measured by a proportion of the normal expected lifespan”; and concluding
that the comparable standard of maturity in our era is “something more like ‘fifty-nine-and-a-half’”).
6 Another is the fact that the Constitution, in some instances, speaks in sweeping vagaries with
weak communicative content. We address that complication later. See infra Part II.
7 That candidate might mount other arguments against this conclusion. But he would not be
in any position to challenge the threshold communicative content of Article II, Section 1. In this
sense the language of the Constitution is at least sometimes constraining—or at least to some extent.
Cf. William Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2213, 2215 (2017)
(suggesting that proponents of the “constraint” premise of originalism “no longer have a clear
champion”); Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 714–15 (2011)
(asserting that “[j]udicial constraint” was once the “heart and soul” of originalism but has since “sold
its soul to gain respect and adherents”).
8 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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declares a “domestic violence” epidemic in the twenty-first century sense of
that phrase, is the federal government obliged to marshal national guard
forces in response to the state’s request for protection?
Here again we find more consensus than dispute. If the eighteenthcentury understanding of “domestic violence” is clear in its reference to an
insurrection, then all prevailing approaches to originalism would credit that
understanding. Most of the action in the interpretive battle in this field
concerns what to do in the face of ambiguity as to the original meaning of the
constitutional text. Where the original meaning is clear, almost everyone
agrees that that meaning controls. The hypothetical request for federal troops
to deal with modern domestic violence would be laughed out of court. And
that’s because almost everyone agrees with what Professor Larry Solum calls
the “Fixation Thesis”—the notion that the communicative content of an
historical legal document is fixed at the time it was adopted—at least in the
(rare) circumstance in which its original communicative content is clear.9
Even careful “living” originalists presumably would agree with this
proposition. They are just less likely to believe that many principles of the
Constitution have a clearly ascertainable original meaning. Jack Balkin, for
example, draws a distinction between the basic “framework” of the
Constitution (which is conceded to be clearly established, fixed, and limiting)
and the “build out” on top of the established framework (the details of which
are not prescribed by any fixed original meaning, and which can be added on
top of the original framework in a process of “construction” that is not
constrained by original meaning).10 Even for a living originalist like Jack
Balkin, the question is which of the provisions of the Constitution have clear
communicative content. Most everyone would agree that some provisions are
clear. The key problems concern (a) how to figure out whether they are clear;
(b) what degree of clarity is required before we deem the document to
constrain; and (c) what to do when the required clarity is absent.
All the action in the theory of constitutional interpretation is thus after
the threshold inquiry into original communicative content.11 Within the
9 Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015).
10 See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
549, 560-61 (2009) (“Living constitutionalism concerns the process of constitutional construction.
Framework originalism leaves space for future generations to build out and construct the
Constitution-in-practice. Living constitutionalism occupies this space. It explains and justifies the
process of building on and building out.”).
11 This is not to say that every constitutional case begins with originalist analysis. There are
many fields of constitutional law that have been completely overtaken by precedent. When an extent
of the precedent in a particular field is rich and the communicative content of the underlying
constitutional provision is poor (as with doctrines of substantive due process), we may expect a court
to begin and end its analysis with the body of precedent without stopping to inquire into original
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family of originalist theories, we may disagree on the proper means of
resolving ambiguity as to original meaning—by resort to tools for assessing
language usage among members of the general public, by reference to
writings of framers or ratifiers, by incorporation of tools of interpretation
employed by lawyers and jurists at the time of the framing, or otherwise. And
we may disagree on what to do if we cannot ultimately resolve the problem
of ambiguity by use of these tools—on whether to fall back on presumption
of constitutionality premised in a burden of proof, or whether to acknowledge
a zone of “construction” that invites tools aimed at establishing “legal
content” having nothing to do with the threshold inquiry into communicative
content. But we all start at the same place—and agree to stop there if the
standard picture is clear.
For all our agreement on the significance of this important starting point, we
have no established methodology for assessing the original communicative content
of the Constitution.12 To date we have paid little attention to the reliability of our
methods for this assessment. And the means we have used fall short in several
ways. In this Article, we highlight some problems with the standard approach to
this inquiry and propose a tool for addressing the deficiencies.
In Part I, we show that the inquiry into original communicative content is
the starting point for all originalist methodologies—and can be the end point
if such content is unambiguous. In Part II, we describe prevailing methods for
assessing original communicative content and identify shortcomings of these
methods. Part III introduces a tool for assessing original communicative
content—a tool used in a field called corpus linguistics, a field that looks for
patterns in meaning and usage in large databases (corpora) of naturally
occurring language. Part IV shows how this tool can be used to find the
original communicative content of provisions of the Constitution. Here and
elsewhere, we consider the original meaning of domestic violence as well as three
important questions of originalist inquiry addressed in high-profile cases—the
scope of the commerce power under Article I, Section 8; the nature of public use
communicative content. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596-2605 (2015) (detailing
the “substantial body of law considering all sides” of the issue of same-sex marriage). But that doesn’t
mean that originalism isn’t the threshold inquiry; it just means that there is a body of precedent that
gives the court a platform for bypassing it.
12 See ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH 116 (2018) (asserting, in contrasting the
inquiry into original intent with the inquiry into original public meaning, that the former has “at
least” one advantage over the latter—it is “an empirical question requiring investigation into the
words, minds, and actions” of the framers or ratifiers; and contending that “[t]he search for original
objective meaning, by contrast, is a theoretical inquiry requiring the judge to don the mantle of a
hypothetical objective person living centuries ago,” a purportedly “much more difficult, if not
impossible, task”); see also Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239,
254-55 (2009) (“[A] newer generation of originalists . . . do not concern themselves with how the
words of the Constitution were actually understood by the Framers, the ratifiers, the public, or
anyone else, but rather with how a hypothetical, reasonable person should have understood them.”).
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under the Takings Clause; and the meaning of natural born citizen in Article II,
Section 5. Then in Part V, we conclude with some observations about how we
see corpus analysis fitting into prevailing originalist methodologies, and some
concessions on limitations of this tool. And we conclude with some
observations about how corpus linguistics could help provide both external
and internal restraint to judges.
I. THE CENTRALITY OF THE INQUIRY INTO ORIGINAL
COMMUNICATIVE CONTENT
Others have laid some of the groundwork that we begin with here. Recent
scholarship has shown that the “originalist family” of theories “agree that the
communicative content of the constitutional text was fixed at the time each
provision was framed and ratified.”13 The differences among originalists go to
the nature and means of the inquiry into original communicative content. Yet
all originalists effectively begin with an inquiry into the original communicative
content of the constitutional text. Below we highlight the centrality of the
inquiry into original communicative content in each of three prevailing theories
of originalism (public meaning, original intent, and methods originalism).
A. Public Meaning Originalism
The case for the primacy of original communicative content is
straightforward under public meaning originalism. The whole point of this
“new originalist” theory was to shift the focus away from mere intentions of
the framers and to inquire instead into the public meaning of the
constitutional text. This was a response to criticisms highlighting “the
difficulty of ascertaining the original intentions of a document drafted by a
multimember constitutional convention and ratified by an even larger group
who met in conventions convened in each state.”14 To address that concern,
original public meaning originalists turned the focus away from framers’
intentions and toward the public’s understanding of the text. For the original
public meaning originalist, the original meaning of the Constitution “that was
proposed in 1787 was necessarily determined in large part by the conventional
semantic meanings of the words and phrases that make up the text and the
regularities of usage that are sometimes summarized as rules of grammar and
syntax.”15
13 Solum, supra note 9, at 7; accord ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS, § 7, at 78 (2012) (“Words must be given the meaning
they had when the text was adopted.”).
14 Solum, supra note 9, at 4.
15 Id. at 28.
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This is an originalist “standard picture.” It is an inquiry into the
communicative content of provisions of the Constitution as they would have
been understood by the public in the late eighteenth century. And it looks for
evidence of “conventional semantic meaning” in the usage and linguistic
conventions of that time.
B. Original Intentions Originalism
An “original intentions” originalist looks for meaning that is “fixed by the
intentions of the framers of the text.”16 Thus, this variation on originalism
may seem more interested in the writings and advocacy of the framers—in
the Federalist Papers, for example, or the records of the constitutional
convention—than in semantic evidence of the meaning of the words they
wrote in the constitution. If so, original intent originalism might be thought
of as eschewing the inquiry into the communicative content of the text.
But a more careful consideration of this branch of originalism uncovers
more common ground than disagreement. For thoughtful original intent
originalists, the relevant “original intentions” are not “applicative” but
“communicative”: “Thus, the intent of a constitutional provision is a mental
state that specifies the communicative content which the framers of that
provision intended to convey through the provision.”17 We can think of
“intentions” as “mental states.” Yet the relevant mental state is not an
aspiration privately held by the framers; it is an intention “encoded in
linguistic representations” in the text of the Constitution.18 This means that
the framers’ writings or advocacy are not direct evidence of the relevant
original communicative content; they are indirect evidence that could help
fill in gaps of underdeterminacy.19 And that brings us back to a search for the
original communicative content of the text of the Constitution.20
Id. at 7.
Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
Id. at 27.
See Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, and the
Constitutional Record, 2017 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1621, 1671 [hereinafter Triangulating Public Meaning]
(“[D]rafting history can provide evidence of conventional semantic meaning, but this role is
evidential.”); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 284 (2017)
(speaking of corpus linguistics as providing “primary evidence” of the relevant “patterns of usage”
and original semantic meaning).
20 Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash thoughtfully question the notion of “intention free
textualism”—”the position that texts can be interpreted without any reference, express or implied,
to the meaning intended by the author of the text.” Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That
English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
967, 968 (2004). They identify persuasive grounds for questioning our ability to resolve ambiguities
in the meaning of a given text without resort to authorial intention. But they do not seem to
ultimately question the salience of the author’s text—or to suggest that an author’s privately held
“intention” could override clear meaning in the words he uses.
16
17
18
19
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There is a parallel here to contemporary approaches to statutory
interpretation.21 “We are all textualists now”22 in the sense that even
purposivist inquiries to statutory interpretation find the text to be the best
evidence of legislative purpose, and deem themselves bound by the clear
meaning of the purpose as stated in the text when it is unambiguous.23 In a
similar sense, it could be said that we are all “original public meaning”
originalists now.24 That holds true to the extent that the original
communicative content of the words of the Constitution is clearly
established. Where that holds, no thoughtful “original intent” originalist
would seek to override the original public meaning with evidence of a
framer’s privately held intentions.
The above-noted example under the Domestic Violence Clause illustrates
the point. If domestic violence is shown widely to have been understood to refer
to a rebellion or uprising, and (almost?) never to speak of an act of assault in
a person’s household, then that should be the end of the inquiry even for a
proponent of “original intent” originalism. That original communicative
Instead, these authors’ thesis seems to be that ambiguities in the meaning of a text cannot be
resolved without consideration of authorial intent. Thus, Alexander and Prakash argue that it is not
possible to discern the “man on the street” meaning a of text by a “sample of average members of
the public.” Id. at 984. A principal concern here is “how much background context” to attribute to
the “average interpreter.” Id. “If we take the law to mean whatever it would mean to a collection of
people who are provided no context whatsoever—other than, perhaps, that its authors were English
speakers and enacted the law on a given date—then we might as well construct a computer program
that incorporates dateable dictionaries and rules of syntax, grammar, and punctuation and ask the
computer to spit out the law’s meaning.” Id. We think Alexander and Prakash were partly onto
something here. We see corpus linguistic analysis as a means of finding “average interpreter”
meaning. And we try to show that this tool can (at least sometimes) provide reliable empirical
evidence of “average interpreter” meaning, and can do so in light of relevant linguistic context.
21 See Chris Wallace, Interview with Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, Fox News Sunday
(July 29, 2012) (Justice Scalia, asserting that “[o]riginalism is sort of a subspecies of textualism”),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/2012/07/29/interview_with_supreme_court_justice_anto
nin_scalia_286094.html [https://perma.cc/Q2VH-9BCS].
22 Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes at
8:28, HARV. L. TODAY (Nov. 17, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scali-lecture-kagandiscusses-statutory-interpretation [http://perma.cc/3BCF-FEFR].
23 See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION
60 (2d ed. 2013) (“Over the last quarter-century, textualism has had an extraordinary influence on
how federal courts approach questions of statutory interpretation. When the Court finds the text to
be clear in context, it now routinely enforces the statute as written.”); Gluck, supra note 2, at 1756–
58 (showing that state supreme courts consistently give primacy to text and decline to look to
external sources of meaning if they find the text “plain”).
24 Justice Elena Kagan and Professor Lawrence Tribe have made similar observations. See
Laurence H. Tribe, Comment (summarizing Ronald Dworkin’s comments in the same volume), in
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 65, 67 (1997) ; Jonathan H. Adler, The
Judiciary Committee Grills Elena Kagan, WASH. POST (June 29, 2010, 1:18 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/29/AR2010062902652.html
[https://perma.cc/PS3F-9CTB] (reporting that during her confirmation hearings, Elena Kagan
declared, “We are all originalists”).
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content, after all, is the best evidence of the framers’ intentions as encoded
in the Domestic Violence Clause. And even a committed original
intentionalist would not be in a position to argue for overriding that intention
with contrary evidence of a framer’s idiosyncratic views. This should hold, at
least, where the evidence of intent as encoded in the text is clear. And that
suggests that the threshold inquiry for original intentionalists should be the
same—they should look first for the original communicative content of the
words of the Constitution.
C. Methods Originalism
This should also hold for “original methods” originalists. The principal
contribution of this theory is to posit that the Constitution was written in a
distinct “dialect”—in the language of the law of the eighteenth century—and
to suggest that we can decode this dialect only by immersing ourselves in the
language community of that dialect.25 This move was aimed, at least in part,
at questioning the basis for “construction” of the Constitution to extend its
terms beyond the “interpretation” of its communicative content. John
McGinnis and Mike Rappaport are the chief proponents of this methodology.
They have advocated that gaps in the Constitution’s communicative content
can be filled in by acknowledging the distinct dialect of the Constitution and
by ascertaining the communicative content of the words of the document
using canons and methods of interpretation that would have been used by
lawyers and judges in the eighteenth century.
But this approach does not at all eschew a threshold inquiry into the
communicative content of the constitutional text. It doesn’t even deny that
some provisions of the Constitution are framed in ordinary language—and not
the language of the law. Thus, a principal difference (to the extent there is
one) between the original public meaning originalists and the original
methods originalists concerns the degree to which each believes that the
Constitution speaks in ordinary terms or in a distinct dialect of the law. And
that means that original methods originalists should also begin with an inquiry
into the communicative content of the words of the Constitution (at least for
terms used in their ordinary sense—a question often begged by theorists, and
which we can also measure using the tools that we introduce below).26
25 See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory
of Originalism and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 751-52 (2009) (stating that
“original methods originalism provides the most accurate method for determining the original
meaning of the Constitution”).
26 In this sense, the divide between public-meaning originalism and methods originalism
seems more apparent than real. Both are aiming for public meaning in the relevant dialect. And both
acknowledge that the Constitution seems to speak in two dialects. The real difference between these
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McGinnis and Rappaport root their theory in the proposition that the
Constitution is written in legal language that “overlays ordinary language.”27
So although they view the document as having been “written in the language
of the law,” they also concede that it “contains both ordinary language and legal
language.”28 This suggests that courts should give legal terms legal meaning. But
it also suggests, as Professors McGinnis and Rappaport note, that “[t]erms that
have only ordinary meanings are given their ordinary meanings.”29
McGinnis and Rappaport seek to categorize legal terms that appear in the
Constitution. They first assert that thirteen terms are unambiguously legal
terms—such as writ of habeas corpus, original jurisdiction, and attainder of
treason.30 Next they identify another forty-four terms as ambiguous,
suggesting that the terms in this category have both a legal meaning and an
ordinary meaning.31 A third group of terms are those the authors see as
“possibly” having “a legal meaning in addition to their ordinary
meaning.”32 This latest group includes natural born citizen; perhaps it could
also include commerce and public use.
In light of the above, we infer that these theorists would view domestic
violence as an ordinary term—not legalese. (This is a testable hypothesis, as
we show in Part IV below.) And so we conclude that the original methods
originalist (like the public meaning and intent originalist) would find
controlling significance in the determination that the phrase domestic violence
would have been understood by the general public to refer to an uprising or
a rebellion—and not an assault against a member of a household.
II. PREVAILING APPROACHES TO THE DEFINITION AND
MEASUREMENT OF ORIGINAL COMMUNICATIVE CONTENT
The above highlights the centrality of the inquiry into original
communicative content for originalist interpretation of the Constitution (and
even for the nonoriginalist who believes that original meaning at least
sometimes is fixed). That leaves the question of how to define and measure
that content. Here we describe prevailing approaches to the definition and
measurement of original communicative content. We also highlight
shortcomings in our existing methodologies.
two theories goes to the means of closing the gap in indeterminate communicative content—whether
by recognition of a construction zone or by original methods.
27 John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the Law,
59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1321, 1326 (2018).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1326-27 (emphasis added).
30 Id. at 137071.
31 Id. at 1371.
32 Id. at 1374.

2019]

Data-Driven Originalism

273

A. The Meaning of Meaning: Prevailing Approaches to Communicative Content
When originalist theorists speak of the original communicative content of
the Constitution, they begin by considering “the conventional semantic
meaning of the words and phrases” as they appear in the Constitution,
“composed into larger units by syntax.”33 Yet they also acknowledge a role for
what linguists speak of as “pragmatics”—the nonsemantic “context” of a given
provision of the Constitution, which is understood to affect the
understanding of communicative content.
Scholars have identified several “forms of contextual enrichment” that
may be relevant to discerning the communicative content of the Constitution.
These include (1) impliciture, essentially an implied ellipsis, as in the idea that
the Article I, Section 9 proviso that “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
Law shall be passed” includes an implied “[by Congress] as an impliciture;” 34
(2) presupposition, or an implication “that is presupposed by what is said in a
particular context,” as exemplified by the Ninth Amendment, which states
that the Constitution’s enumeration of rights “shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people,” and thus presupposes that “there
are rights that are retained by the people;”35 and (3) modulation, the use of “an
old word [] in a new way” in a particular context, as with the use of “recess”
in the Recess Appointments Clause.36

33 Solum, Originalist Methodology, supra note 19, at 272; see also KURT T. LASH, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP 277 (2014) (“I have defined original meaning as the likely original understanding of the
text at the time of its adoption by competent speakers of the English language who are aware of the
context in which the text was communicated for ratification. Rather than seeking framers’ intentions
or linguistically possible interpretations, my effort has been to identify patterns of usage that signal
commonly accepted meaning.”); Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection
Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 GEO. MASON U. C. R. L.J. 1, 12 (2008) (“[O]ne should look for what
readers of the historically-situated text would have understood the constitutional language to
express.”); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 291, 398 (2002) (trying to determine “the meaning the language [of the Constitution] would
have had . . . to an average, informed speaker and reader of that language at the time of its enactment
into law”); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1118, 1131 (2003) (seeking to understand “the meaning the words
and phrases of the Constitution would have had, in context, to ordinary readers, speakers, and writers
of the English language, reading a document of this type, at the time adopted”—the “meaning [words
and phrases of the Constitution’s text] would have had at the time they were adopted as law, within
the [legal] and linguistic community that adopted the text as law”). .
34 Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 19, at 1635.
35 Id. at 1636.
36 Id. .
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Careful theorists also distinguish “original expected applications” from
the original communicative content of the constitutional text.37 One scholar
makes the distinction by reference to the Second Amendment. He says that
the inquiry into the original communicative content of the “right to bear
arms” is aimed at discerning the understanding of that phrase in its semantic
and pragmatic context. And he distinguishes that content from expected
applications—e.g., the belief “that muskets and flintlocks were ‘arms’ within
the meaning of the Second Amendment,” or the belief that a particular
individual was old enough to be eligible to serve as President of the United
States under Article Two, Section 1.38
“Original expected applications” are relevant under this view, but they
bear only evidentiary significance. “Thus, if the framers believed that muskets
and flintlocks were ‘arms’ within the meaning of the Second Amendment,
that fact is evidence that favors any theory of the meaning of arms that
encompasses muskets and flintlocks and is evidence that disfavors any
interpretation that would exclude them.”39 Yet there may also “be cases where
application expectations are incorrect.”40 Here we can return to the Article II
age requirement. “[I]f the members of the Philadelphia Convention had a
false belief about the age of a potential presidential candidate, such that the
individual would not have been eligible for election to the presidency in 1782
(because the individual was actually thirty-two and not thirty-six), the
expectation that the Article Two requirement that the President be 35 years
of age would be satisfied does not provide evidence that the phrase ‘the age
of thirty five years’ had some weird meaning . . . .”41 Where the
communicative content of a provision is clear, we can simply assume the
existence of a “factual error” about an expected application. And, in that
instance, the probative value of the expected application will fail to override
our clear understanding of original communicative content.
The original communicative content will not, of course, always be clear.
Originalist theory recognizes that the bare communicative content will be
“sparse” for some provisions of the Constitution and “rich” for others.42 And
there is extensive, ongoing debate about the proper response to “sparse”
communicative content—whether by “construction” in light of means and
37 See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 296-97
(2007) (“[C]onstitutional interpretation is not limited to those applications specifically intended or
expected by the framers and adopters of the constitutional text.”).
38 Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 19, at 1638 .
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See Solum, Originalist Methodology, supra note 19, at 271 (“The phrase ‘freedom of speech’ has
sparse communicative content, but the legal content of free speech doctrine is very rich.”).

2019]

Data-Driven Originalism

275

methods aimed at something other than discerning communicative content,
application of “original methods” to resolve ambiguity, deference to political
branches of government, or application of a presumption of constitutionality
and concomitant burden of proof.43
These are some basic tenets of the originalist inquiry into the
communicative content of the terms of the Constitution. Originalist practice,
of course, is not always in line with the more careful tenets of the theory. In
the rest of this Article, we examine three test cases:
1. of the communicative content of Congress’s power to regulate
“commerce” under Article I, Section 8,
2. of the nature of the “public use” element of the Takings Clause, and
3. the conditions of the requirement in Article II that the President be
a “natural born citizen.”
We begin by examining two originalist opinions of Justice Thomas on the
first two of our three test cases—on commerce and public use. Our aim is to
highlight some shortcomings of current originalist practice, while
recognizing, in fairness, that much of the refinement in originalist
methodology is the product of fairly recent scholarship, and thus could not
properly be expected of judges lacking the benefit of recent developments
(much less the familiarity with the tools we advocate).44
1. Commerce
Our analysis of the communicative content of the Commerce Clause
focuses on Justice Thomas’s opinion in United States v. Lopez, as that is the
opinion that focuses on this question most directly. Justice Thomas concurred
separately in the Court’s decision in Lopez striking down the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 as exceeding Congress’s power under Article I,
Section 8. He did so based on an analysis aimed at “show[ing] how far” the
court’s precedents had “departed from the original understanding” of this
provision.45

On this last point, see Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 859-60 (1992).
We also note that Justice Thomas’s recent opinions seem to be moving in the direction we
advocate here. In Lucia v. Securities & Exchange Commission, Justice Thomas bolstered his conclusion
that SEC Administrative Law Judges are “Officers of the United States” subject to the
Appointments Clause by reference to the corpus linguistic analysis of the original meaning of
“officers” presented in Jen Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443
(2018). See 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2056-57 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). And in Carpenter v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238 n.4 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting), Justice Thomas looked to the Corpus
of Founding-Era American English for evidence of use of the phrase “expectation(s) of privacy” for
his analysis of whether “[t]he word ‘search’ was . . . associated with ‘reasonable expectation of
privacy’” in the founding era.
45 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
43
44
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This formulation seems to cue an inquiry into the original communicative
content of the text of the Commerce Clause. That also seems confirmed by
the lead points in Justice Thomas’s analysis—his citation to founding-era
dictionaries, which he cites as establishing that “‘commerce’ consisted of
selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.”46
Justice Thomas also seems to recognize the significance of semantic
context. In footnote 2 of his opinion, Justice Thomas contextualizes the clause
by emphasizing that the full text does not give Congress the “authority to
regulate all commerce.”47 Justice Thomas notes that “[e]ven to speak of ‘the
Commerce Clause’ perhaps obscures the actual scope of that Clause,” given
that the full text empowers Congress only to “regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”48
Justice Thomas supports his conclusions about the original
communicative content of the Commerce Clause by citing historical sources
such as “exchanges during the ratification campaign” that show the “relatively
limited reach of the Commerce Clause and of federal power generally.”49 He
also cites Hamilton’s writings that congressional control over “the recesses of
domestic life” and “the private conduct of individuals” would have been “just
cause for rejecting the Constitution.”50 But in raising Hamilton’s writings in
this way, Justice Thomas seems to be resorting to evidence of original expected
applications rather than original communicative content.
The opinion unambiguously shifts into original expected applications by
identifying agriculture as a concern that the Founders thought “would remain
outside the reach of the Federal Government” but that “substantially affected”
commerce.51 Justice Thomas cites Hamilton as writing that “the supervision of
agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature” “would be as troublesome
as it would be nugatory.”52 And this shift occurs without acknowledging the
difference between original communicative content and original expected
applications.53 Granted, because he begins with an inquiry into original
understanding, it is certainly possible to view the applications evidence as mere
evidence, and not as an indication of an inquiry into pure framers’ intent.

46 Id. at 585–86 (citing SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 361 (4th
ed. 1773); NATHAN BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1789);
THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796)).
47 Id. at 587 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 590.
50 Id. at 592.
51 Id. at 590.
52 Id. at 591 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton)).
53 Id.
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2. Public Use
We also focus on Justice Thomas’s dissent in Kelo v. Town of New London.
In Kelo, Justice Thomas analyzes the original communicative content of the
public use proviso in the Takings Clause. Justice Thomas wrote separately to
criticize the majority’s approach, which required only a “public purpose,” and
not any “use” of property in the sense of the government actively employing
the property in some way.
Justice Thomas says that public use in the Takings Clause, “originally
understood, is a meaningful limit on the government’s eminent domain
power.”54 He first focuses on original semantic meaning of the terms in the
public use provision to illustrate the original communicative content. He
searches for the original meaning of the operative words by consulting
founding-era dictionaries and tracing the etymology of the words.55
The Thomas opinion also invokes the semantic context of the Clause,
noting that the original meaning of the term use must be narrow because the
Constitution employs the term narrowly in other contexts. Justice Thomas
shows that “[e]lsewhere, the Constitution twice employs the word ‘use,’ both
times in its narrower sense.”56 In this way, Justice Thomas excludes other
possible contemporary dictionary definitions.57
Justice Thomas also contextualizes the clause in his attempt to show the
original communicative content by contrasting the term public use with other
constitutional terms—general welfare and necessary and proper. Justice Thomas
writes that “[t]he Framers would have used some such broader term [general
welfare] if they had meant the Public Use Clause to have a similarly sweeping
scope.”58 And he argues that the majority’s “interpretation of the Public Use
Clause also unnecessarily duplicates a similar inquiry required by the
Necessary and Proper Clause.”59
Justice Thomas last uses evidence of founding-era practices to show
original communicative content. He cites Blackstone’s writings, which state
that private property was held in such high regard that the law “will not
authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the
whole community.”60 He also shows that early state practices “shed light on
the original meaning of the same words contained in the Public Use Clause.”
And he says that states during the founding era used their eminent domain
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 508.
Id. at 509.
See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999) (classifying this
method of constitutional exegesis as intratextualism).
58 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 509 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 511.
60 Id. at 510 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135).
54
55
56
57
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power to provide only for “quintessentially public goods, such as public roads,
toll roads, ferries, canals, railroads, and public parks.”61
In citing founding-era writings and referring to early state practices,
Justice Thomas does not distinguish between original public meaning and
original intent. In citing the founders’ views on private property, he seems to
be adhering to an original intent theory—though he could simply be using
these sources as evidence of how the public would have understood the clause.
But he also seems to shift to original public meaning when citing early state
practices, without acknowledging a shift in methodology.
B. The Measurement of Meaning: Prevailing Tools for Assessing Communicative
Content
The scholarship in this field has often skated over the question of our
methodology for measuring original communicative content. But a few
scholars have begun to highlight some important issues.
A pathbreaking piece was Randy Barnett’s study of the original meaning
of the Commerce Clause. Barnett sought to assess the communicative content
of commerce by examining every use of that word in the Pennsylvania Gazette
from 1728 to 1800.62 Barnett did so because he recognized the limitations of
traditional originalist methods, noting that they make it “difficult to know
whether the evidence of usage offered by a particular [scholar] was typical or
cherry-picked.”63 He acknowledged that “the general public [may] have taken
the word [commerce] in its broader sense notwithstanding how participants
in the drafting or ratification processes [may] have used the term.” So he
sought “to conduct comprehensive empirical surveys” of ordinary foundingera material.64 We view this as an important scholarly development—an early
recognition of a point we develop below (that the inquiry into original public
meaning is an empirical one requiring representative data).65
61 Id. at 512.
62 See Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK.
L. REV. 847, 856-57 (2003) (“Rather than sample these uses, each assistant separately . . . examined

every appearance of [commerce] to see whether it was being used in its narrower or broader sense.”).
While Professor Barnett cites historians who claim that the newspaper is representative, that is an
empirical claim without much linguistic proof. For other, more recent scholarship trying to build on
Barnett’s methodological breakthrough, see Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United
States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 468 (2018); James Cleith Phillips & Sara White, The Meaning of the
Three Emoluments Clauses in the U.S. Constitution: A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of American English, 1760–
1799, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 183 (2018); Lee J. Strang, The Original Meaning of “Religion” in the First
Amendment: A Test Case of Originalism’s Utilization of Corpus Linguistics, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1683, 1696.
63 Barnett, supra note 62, at 856.
64 Id. at 856 & n.30.
65 See also Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66
(2011) (observing that the Constitution’s original public meaning “can typically be discovered by
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Barnett’s Arkansas Law Review piece builds on his earlier work on the
original meaning of commerce. In a 2001 piece in the University of Chicago Law
Review, Barnett inquired into whether Justice Thomas was correct in Lopez
that commerce was “limited to trade or exchange of goods” or whether it could
“refer to any gainful activity.”66 His study recognized the need to go beyond
evidence of the founders’ intended meaning. Thus, Barnett sought to
determine the original communicate content of commerce by conducting a
systematic linguistic survey of the constitutional record. He surveyed each
usage of the term commerce in the text of the Constitution itself, contemporary
dictionaries, the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist Papers, ratification
conventions, and judicial opinions. And he found that in the Constitutional
Convention, ratification debates, and the Federalist Papers, the “term
‘commerce’ was consistently used in the narrow sense and that there is no
surviving example of it being used in either source in any broader sense.”67
More recently, Larry Solum has noted that the inquiry into original
communicative content often relies on (1) “prereflective beliefs” of
contemporary readers “about the meanings of the words and phrases that
make up the text,” and (2) “dictionaries from the historical periods in which
the various provisions of the text were authored.”68 To this list we would add
(3) reliance on examples of English usage in writings from the relevant time
period—writings that may or may not be a part of the legal “record” involved
in the ratification of the Constitution, and which are cited to show usage or
meaning of a particular word or phrase in relevant linguistic context; and (4)
invocation of the etymology of words in the Constitution.
Solum helpfully identifies a range of problems with “an intuition-anddictionary-based methodology for discovering the meaning of the
constitutional text.”69 And he proposes a more systematic inquiry comprised
of three components: (1) corpus linguistic analysis (our subject here); (2)
“immersion” in “texts from the relevant period” to allow judges of original
meaning “to ‘train up’ their linguistic intuitions”; and (3) study of the
“constitutional record,” including “precursor provisions and proposals,”
drafting history, ratification debates, early historical practice, and early
judicial decisions.70 We discuss these components in greater detail in Part V.

empirical investigation”); Green, supra note 33, at 44 (implying that one must “survey[] a mass of
historically-prominent and framing-era material” because “[r]ecovering the historic textually-expressed
constitutional sense requires the interpreter to put herself as much as possible in the position of
informed people at the time that language was made part of the Constitution”).
66 Randy Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 112 (2001).
67 Id. at 104.
68 Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 19, at 1639.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1655.
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For now, we simply note the importance of Solum’s contribution to the
question of the proper methodology.
A key point made by Solum concerns the relationship between direct
linguistic inquiries into original communicative content and more traditional
studies of the constitutional record. Too often we collapse these inquiries into
one overarching search for “original meaning.” But if we are seeking to
distinguish communicative content from legal content, or interpretation from
construction, we should recognize that the study of the constitutional record
is of secondary (circumstantial) significance. We may use the drafting history
or ratification debates as evidence of the communicative content of the
constitutional text.71 But it is mere evidence. And if we are confident that the
words adopted in the Constitution would have been understood by the public
in a certain way (if the standard picture is clear), then we could find the
circumstantial evidence in the drafting history to be overridden by direct
evidence of original communicative content.
Courts that have considered these questions have not always appreciated
these nuances. Again, this is not surprising. But we highlight the inquiries
into commerce and public use here to set the stage for our proposal for a
different approach below.
1. Commerce
Justice Thomas begins his opinion in Lopez by focusing on tools aimed at
establishing the original semantic meaning of the words. He cites to
founding-era dictionaries to establish that “‘commerce’ consisted of selling,
buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.”72 He also
cites the etymology of the word— “which literally means ‘with
merchandise’”—in support of the term’s limited scope.73
But he quickly shifts to examples of usage from prominent founders such as
Alexander Hamilton. He notes that the founders often used the term commerce
“in contradistinction to productive activities such as manufacturing and
agriculture.”74 Hamilton, for instance, wrote that the “supervision of agriculture
. . . can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction.”75 Justice Thomas uses
these sources as tools to infer that the original communicative content of the
71 See id. at 21 (“[T]he drafting history can provide evidence of conventional meaning, but this
role is evidential.”).
72 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing SAMUEL
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 361 (4th ed. 1773); NATHAN BAILEY, AN
UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1789); THOMAS SHERIDAN, A
COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796)).
73 Id. at 586.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 591 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton)).
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term commerce could not have been gainful activity generally; otherwise
Hamilton and others would not have made the distinction between the concepts.
The Thomas opinion also cites sources that illustrate the founders’ views
on government generally. He notes that “comments of Hamilton and others
about federal power reflected the well-known truth that the new Government
would have only the limited and enumerated powers found in the
Constitution.”76 And if the federal government was to be one of limited
authority, Thomas concludes that the original communicative content of the
Commerce Clause could not have been one giving Congress boundless power.
2. Public Use
In Kelo, Justice Thomas again begins his inquiry into original
communicative content by citing founding-era dictionaries. He cites Samuel
Johnson’s 1773 dictionary as defining use as “[t]he act of employing any thing
to any purpose.”77 And he notes that when the property is devoted to private
use, “it strains language to say that the public is ‘employing’ the property.”78
As in Lopez, Justice Thomas also again turns to etymology. He traces the
English word use to the Latin word utor, meaning “to use, make use of, avail
one’s self of, employ, apply, enjoy, etc.”79
The Thomas opinion also tries to infer the original communicative
content of the words public use from founding-era views on property
generally. He cites Blackstone’s writings that private property rights are so
highly regarded that the law “will not authorize the least violation of it.”80
And he infers from these early sources that the Public Use Clause “embodied
the Framers’ understanding that property is a natural, fundamental right.”81
Justice Thomas also uses a survey of early state practices as tool for
determining the original communicative content of the clause. He
acknowledges that some early states “tested the limits of their state-law
eminent domain power.”82 But he notes that most states limited their eminent
domain for “quintessentially public goods” such as roads, ferries, canals, and
parks.83 And he says that all other uses of eminent domain were “hotly
contested.”84 Justice Thomas suggests that these early practices are strong
evidence of the original public understanding of the clause.
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id. at 592.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 508 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (quoting JOHN LEWIS, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 165, at 224 n.4 (1888)).
Id. at 510.
Id.
Id at 513.
Id. at 512–13.
Id. at 513.
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C. Shortcomings of Existing Methodologies
The above sets the stage for some observations about shortcomings in our
existing methods of measuring original communicative content.85 We do so
with some caveats and with a degree of hesitation. A principal caveat is an
acknowledgement that the practice of originalism is in a state of refinement.
Many refinements in originalist methodology have come in recent years, so
it is unfair to criticize judges who have approached originalist questions
without the benefit of recent thinking.
We hope that this project will be an element of that refinement. And it is
even less fair to charge judges confronting originalist questions in cases
decided decades ago with the methods we propose here. The judges who
confronted the questions in Lopez and in Kelo could not possibly have pursued
the inquiries we propose here—not only because they likely were not aware
of the linguistic tools we propose, but also because the digitized databases
that we employ have been created recently.
For these reasons, we don’t want to be heard as lambasting the originalist
analysis in the Lopez and Kelo opinions. We think any originalism is better
than no originalism. And we laud the judges whose work we discuss here,86
even while proceeding to identify shortcomings in the methods that they have
employed (and hoping that our criticisms will be seen in the constructive
spirit in which they are intended).
With these caveats, we identify here a series of concerns with the common
course of the originalist inquiry into communicative content, highlighting the
Lopez and Kelo opinions we have discussed above (and as a preview to our
further inquiry into the commerce and public use questions presented in those
cases in Part IV below).87

85 For some related critiques of traditional originalist methodology, see Lee J. Strang, How Big
Data Can Increase Originalism’s Methodological Rigor: Using Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original
Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181, 1200 (2017) (“Critics insisted that originalism’s
reliance on history continued to open it to the Inaccuracy Critique.”).
86 In full disclosure, this includes present company. One of us is an appellate judge, the other
his former law clerk. And our own originalist inquiries undoubtedly have fallen short in some of the
respects enumerated here. So if it sounds like we’re pointing the finger at the Lopez and Kelo
opinions, we concede that we have other fingers pointing back at ourselves.
87 We don’t delve here into another originalist methodology—an inquiry into early practice as
evidence of the original public understanding of the clause. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S.
Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (declaring that “in interpreting the Clause, we put significant weight upon
historical practice” (emphasis omitted)). We see this as more of a behavioral than a linguistic inquiry.
Perhaps evidence of historical practice could tell us something about communicative content. But
such evidence would have only indirect—circumstantial—evidentiary significance.
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1. Problems with Founding-Era Dictionaries
We (and others) have written elsewhere of the shortcomings of
dictionaries in any inquiry into the communicative content of words.88 We
catalog and expand on those shortcomings here.
a. Insufficient Semantic Context
A threshold point is that dictionaries often lack the semantic context
necessary to assess the communicative content of a constitutional phrase.
Dictionaries typically define individual words, not phrases.89 And because the
human brain understands words not in isolation but in their broader semantic
(and pragmatic) context, we may often miss the import of a given constitutional
term if we just separately look up its component words in the dictionary.90
The public use question most easily illustrates this point. We can look up
the word use in a founding-era dictionary, as Justice Thomas did in Kelo. And
that will tell us something of relevance to the meaning of the phrase public
use. But that may not be conclusive. The communicative content of public use
may conceivably be derived by looking up public and use in a dictionary. But
that use of a dictionary can also be misleading. That’s because the
communicative content of a phrase isn’t always the sum of its parts.91 This is
the linguistic problem of “compositionality”: the “meaning of a complex
expression” is sometimes a “compositional function of the meanings of its
semantic constituents,”92 and sometimes not—as where “the combination of
words has a meaning of its own that is not a reliable amalgamation of the
88 See Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788,
808 (2018) (noting that “[t]he dictionaries typically cited by our courts . . . make no claims about
the relative frequency of the listed senses of a given word”) ; Phillips & White, supra note 62, at 189
(“[M]odern dictionaries can usually note what has been ‘linguistically permissible’ at a particular
time, but not what was likely in a given scenario.”).
89 See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 88, at n.141 (citing OXFORD DICTONARY OF ENGLISH xi
(3d ed. 2010) (“The general principle on which the senses in the Oxford Dictionary of English are
organized is that each word . . . has at least one core sense or core meaning . . . .”).
90 Some dictionaries (even founding-era ones) sometimes give examples of word usage in
context. But those examples are unlikely to give sufficient semantic context, for a number of reasons.
First, again, we’re not dealing with phrases, but just words. So the dictionary providing a sentence
using the word public and another using the word use tells us nothing about how public use is used in
context. Second, example sentences in founding-era dictionaries, at least, tend to be sentences from
a much older time period from a famous source or author. This tells us little about contemporary
usage by “ordinary” folks. Finally, one or two example sentences is too small a sample size to
generalize to an era’s greater population of language users.
91 See generally Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary AND Proper” and “Cruel AND Unusual”: Hendiadys
in the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 692 (2016) (“There is of course more than one way to read
‘necessary and proper’ and ‘cruel and unusual.’ Each phrase could be read as two requirements. Or
each phrase could be read as a tautology.” (footnote omitted)).
92 ALAN CRUSE, MEANING IN LANGUAGE 83-84 (2011).
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components at all, e.g. no fear, at all, for good.”93 A related problem is the
“idiom principle,” or the existence of “semi-preconstructed phrases that
constitute single choices [in communication], even though they might appear
analyzable into segments”94—like of course or in fact. We could look up of and
course in the dictionary, but in doing so we would probably incorrectly
determine what the idiom of course means.
Public use could be one of those sorts of phrases. Or it could be a phrase
with distinct meaning in the dialect of “legalese.”95 If so we could not
accurately construct the communicative content of public use by looking up
public and use in a dictionary.96
The same almost certainly goes for domestic violence. We could look up the
word domestic and the word violence in a founding-era dictionary, piece
together the definitions, and come with a very modern sense of domestic
violence—of an act causing bodily injury to a member of a person’s household.
But that could be a linguistic mistake (and is, as we show in Part IV.A.)
b. Polysemy
A second problem stems from what linguists call polysemy—the existence
of multiple senses of a given term. This is a common source of indeterminacy
in our search for communicative content. And when a word is polysemous we
cannot resolve the question of original communicative content by resort to a
dictionary—for several reasons.
The first reason stems from the nature of historical dictionaries.97 The
most commonly cited founding-era dictionaries are Samuel Johnson’s 1773
Dictionary of the English Language and Noah Webster’s 1828 publication. And
these two dictionaries, like many others over history, are a product of
“piracy.”98 Webster plagiarized from Johnson, and Johnson, in turn, borrowed
93 Alison Wray, Why Are We So Sure We Know What a Word Is?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF THE WORD 737 (John R. Taylor ed., 2015).
94 John McH. Sinclair, Collocation: A Progress Report, in LANGUAGE TOPICS: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF M. HALLIDAY 320 (Ross Steele & Terry Threadgold eds., 1987).
95 See infra Section IV.B.
96 A founding-era legal dictionary could conceivably solve this problem. If public use was a legal

term of art with a settled meaning in the law at the time of the founding, perhaps we could find
evidence of that in a founding-era legal dictionary. Yet we have found no evidence of that. The
founding-era legal dictionaries we consulted do not define public use. See TIMOTHY
CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1783); GILES JACOB, A NEW
LAW-DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1739).
97 For further analysis of pros and cons of other founding-era dictionaries, see Gregory E.
Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era to Determine the Original Meaning
of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 358 (2014).
98 See SIDNEY I. LAUNDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 43
(3d ed. 2001) (“The history of English lexicography usually consists of a recital of successive and
often successful acts of piracy.”).
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extensively from his predecessors.99 This is significant. It means that
dictionaries of this era can create a false sense of consensus. If we consult a
couple of founding-era dictionaries and find a single definition of commerce,
we might be tempted to conclude that that is the accepted sense of the term.
But it might not be. The commonality might just be the result of plagiarism.
If Johnson left out an alternative sense of commerce, then Webster is likely to
have continued the oversight.
A second, and related, problem is that any single founding-era dictionary
was generally the work of one or two minds—with the two most influential
dictionaries of the period (Johnson’s and Webster’s) the epitome of this
phenomenon.100 Thus, the idiosyncratic nature of dictionaries
contemporaneous with the Constitution means that these dictionaries may
reflect more of what the dictionary writer thought than the general
understanding of the public. While all dictionaries do not “emerge from some
lexicographical Sinai” and “are the products of human beings,” a dictionary
written by just one or two people is even more susceptible to the fact that
“human beings, try as they may, bring their prejudices and biases into the
dictionaries they make.”101 So it’s unclear how much Johnson’s dictionary
reflected common usage of the era or just Johnson’s views.
A third reason founding-era dictionary definitions may not be up to the
task of telling us the ordinary meaning of the words they define is the
prescriptive rather than descriptive nature of dictionaries at the time (and up
until the last half of the twentieth century).102 Normative (or prescriptive)
dictionaries “establish what is right in meaning and pronunciation,” providing
users with what the lexicographer deems the “proper” usage of each word.103
99 See, e.g., ALLEN REDDICK, THE MAKING OF JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY, 1746-1773 11 (1996);
Maggs, supra note 97, at 383 (“Samuel Johnson apparently relied on Bailey’s definitions when he
prepared his dictionary.”).
100 See JONATHON GREEN, CHASING THE SUN: DICTIONARY MAKERS AND THE
DICTIONARIES THEY MADE 4 (1997) [hereinafter CHASING THE SUN]:
Johnson and Webster stand as the ultimate personifications of the solo artistes. Johnson had his
amanuenses . . . Webster had a single proofreader, enlisted toward the end of the project. But these
assistants were secondary figures. In neither case did the man whose name adorns the title page
allow such helpers to influence his end product.
101 Id. at xiv.
102 Webster’s Third International Dictionary was the first to break this mold. See also Green,
supra note 100, at 449-57; HERBERT C. MORTON, THE STORY OF WEBSTER’S THIRD: PHILIP
GOVE’S CONTROVERSIAL DICTIONARY AND ITS CRITICS 202–06 (1994); JAMES SLEDD &
WILMA R. EBBIT, DICTIONARIES AND THAT DICTIONARY 79 (1962) (quoting the editor-in-chief
of Webster’s Third as stating that “the dictionary’s purpose was to report the language, not to
prescribe what belonged in it”); ; Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has
Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 242
(1999).
103 Webster’s Way Out Dictionary, Bus. Week, Sept. 16, 1961, at 89, reprinted in DICTIONARIES
AND THAT DICTIONARY 57 (James Sledd & Wilma R. Ebbitt eds., 1962).
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Because of this, “the prescriptive school of thought relie[d] heavily on the
editors of dictionaries to define and publish the proper meaning and usage of
the terms.”104 On the other hand, “the editors of a descriptive dictionary
describe how a word is being used and, unlike their prescriptive counterparts,
do not decide how a word should be used.”105 And “[l]exicographical
prescriptivism in the United States is exactly as old as the making of
dictionaries, because of the role played by the dictionary in a society
characterized by a great deal of linguistic insecurity.”106 Thus, the prescriptive
nature of founding-era dictionaries makes them less useful for determining
how people actually used language during that time, just as Strunk and White’s
Elements of Style is more indicative of how people in the twentieth century were
encouraged to write than how they actually wrote.107
Lexicographers also tend to be either lumpers (combining senses) or
splitters (distinguishing senses).108 Given the difficulties of creating a
dictionary in the founding era when just one or two shouldered the workload,
limited resources would tend to push founding-era lexicographers toward
lumping rather than splitting, entirely missing some senses of words or
providing definitions that are overly broad.
Even if we can trust the list of definitions in a dictionary, we are still
unlikely to find a reliable indicator of communicative content just by looking
there. Descriptive dictionaries are “museums” of word meanings.109 That is,
they list the attested senses of listed words. The point of this function is to
list all known definitions or senses. So if there are alternative senses of a given
term, a dictionary would list both of them. And it wouldn’t tell you which
one is the one likely to be understood in a given linguistic context.

Thumma & Kirchmeier, supra note 102, at 242.
Id.
HENRI BÉJOINT, TRADITION AND INNOVATION IN MODERN DICTIONARIES 116 (1994).
Prescriptive dictionaries are not completely irrelevant to understanding language use since
they could have influenced how people understood and thus used language, but this is a one-stepremoved type of argument rather than directly looking at how people actually used language.
108 See KORY STAMPER, WORD BY WORD: THE SECRET LIFE OF DICTIONARIES 119 (2017)
(“Lumpers are definers who tend to write broad definitions that can cover several more minor
variations on that meaning; splitters are people who tend to write discrete definitions for each of
those minor variations.”); see also ANNE O’KEEFFE & MICHAEL MCCARTHY, THE ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 434 (2010) (discussing “lumpers” and “splitters”).
109 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 67 (1994) (referring to dictionaries as “museum[s] of words”); see also
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1375-76 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994) (“Unabridged dictionaries are historical records (as reliable as the judgment and industry of
the editors) of the meanings with which words have in fact been used by writers of good repute.
They are often useful in answering hard questions of whether, in an appropriate context, a particular
meaning is linguistically permissible.”) (emphasis added).
104
105
106
107
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When we speak of finding the communicative content of the words of the
law, we sometimes speak of finding “ordinary” meaning. And ordinary meaning
seems to implicate an empirical question—the sense of a term that is more
commonly used or understood.110 Yet dictionaries can’t answer that question.
That’s because “[t]he dictionaries typically cited by our courts . . . make no
claims about the relative frequency of the listed senses of a given word.”111 For
this reason we couldn’t look to the dictionary to determine which of two
alternative senses of “commerce” is the more ordinary one. We would likely
find both senses listed, leaving us in the dark about how to interpret that term.
c. Wrong Timeframe
A third problem with reliance on the dictionary is a timeframe problem.
Noah Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language is in a sense not old enough:
It was published in 1828—almost 40 years after the Constitution was ratified.
For that reason, Webster’s dictionary may reflect English usage of the wrong
era; it could be affected by any linguistic drift that occurred in the 40-year
period after ratification.
There’s another sense, however, in which Webster’s 1828 dictionary is too
old: This dictionary, like others of its era, draws upon usage examples from
much earlier periods—two of the most common being Shakespeare and the
Bible. To the extent it does so, Webster’s would miss the extensive linguistic
drift that occurred over centuries leading up to the founding era.
That problem is more acute, of course, for Samuel Johnson’s dictionary.
“Johnson’s dictionary reports English usage in Great Britain from a period
that ended thirty-two years before the drafting of the United States
Constitution in 1787.”112 (And to the extent Johnson was plagiarizing earlier
dictionaries or sources, his definitions are even older.) Lest one think that
thirty-two years before or forty-years after are insufficiently short time
periods for linguistic drift, below we document how such drift occurred in
just a decade or two for the term domestic violence.113

110 See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 88, at 808 (making this point in the context of
statutory interpretation).
111 Id.
112 Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 19, at 1642 .
113 Even dictionaries published much closer to the writing of the Constitution, such as in the
late 1780s or early 1790s, may not be from the correct time frame; there is still a problem if they
plagiarized older dictionaries. And if they are, they would be unlikely to capture linguistic drift.
Granted, dictionaries, even those published a bit before or after the time period at issue have some
value in determining original meaning, but they are more of a starting point than an ending point
in the inquiry.
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2. The Fallacy of Etymology
The problem with invoking the etymology of a word or phrase is even
easier to establish. If our usage and understanding of a word have evolved
over time, as they often will, the historical pedigree of a word may direct us
to an outmoded or even obsolete definition.114 Thus, if we are trying to
recreate the ordinary understanding of a given word or phrase in a given
language at a particular time, we cannot do so by tracing back the origins of
the word to another language centuries before. That approach would lead us
to the conclusion that December is the tenth month of the year, or that an
anthology is a bouquet of flowers.115 We have no reason to believe that ordinary
Americans in the late eighteenth century were familiar with the etymology
of commerce or public use. And for that reason, it makes no sense to seek to
derive the original communicative content of these English terms in this
period by turning to their etymological origins in other languages.
3. Linguistic Intuition and Sample Sentences from Founding-Era
Literature
Some of the shortcomings of the dictionary can be addressed by resort to a
judge’s linguistic intuition—with confirmation by reference to examples of actual
usage in literature from the founding era. So if we think that domestic violence or
public use bear meanings not evident in a sum of the definitions of the words in
these phrases, we can look for examples of the full phrases in founding-era
literature. And if we find multiple examples of use of these phrases, we can
perhaps overcome the plagiarism or false-consensus-bias problems noted above.
We may even be able to amass enough examples to convince ourselves that we
have derived the common or ordinary sense of a given phrase.
A twenty-first-century judge’s linguistic intuition may not be a reliable
measure of communicative content of usage that has now drifted for almost
two and a half centuries. Judges of our era are much more likely to be affected
by our sense of contemporary usage, and thus to miss the effects of drift.116
114 See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 88, at 809–10 (developing this point in critiquing judicial
reliance on etymology in statutory interpretation).
115 December, THE BARNHART CONCISE DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 188 (Robert K.
Barnhart ed., 1995) (“1122, borrowed from Old French decembre, from Latin December, from decem
TEN, this being originally the tenth month of the early Roman calendar (which began with
March).”); Anthology, THE BARNHART CONCISE DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 29 (Robert K.
Barnhart ed., 1995) (“1640, collection of the ‘flowers’ of verse (i.e., small, choice poems) by various
authors; borrowed, perhaps by influence of French anthologie, from Greek anthologíā flower-gathering
(ánthos flower + légein gather) . . . .”).
116 See Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 19, at 1641-42 (“Because of the
phenomenon of linguistic drift (or semantic shift), contemporary linguistic intuitions are not a
reliable guide to the conventional semantic meanings of older provisions of the constitutional text.”)

2019]

Data-Driven Originalism

289

So our intuitions are likely to be affected by our biases “about what the
constitutional language ‘ought to mean.’”117 “The influence of these beliefs on
[judicial] intuitions may not be fully transparent;” in other words [judges]
may have strong beliefs about what the constitutional language ‘ought to
mean,’ and thus “not recognize the role of their own biases and
preconceptions.”118
What about the practice of finding and listing naturally occurring examples
of language usage—in writings of the framers or even the general public?
Again, this is commendable in that it lets us home in on the right timeframe
and consider a full phrase (with more semantic context). But looking at sample
sentences introduces another set of problems—arising out of the limited nature
of the dataset, the opaque nature of the method of selecting sample sentences,
and the risk of confirmation bias or motivated reasoning. If we are looking for
empirical evidence of common usage or meaning of a particular word or phrase,
our dataset should be larger and more representative.
III. CORPUS LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS: A BETTER MEANS OF
MEASURING ORIGINAL COMMUNICATIVE CONTENT
For all these reasons, we propose the use of a better tool for measuring
the original communicative content of the Constitution. This tool is one we
import from a field called corpus linguistics. Here we describe the nature of
corpus linguistic analysis and identify the corpora (databases) and tools used
in this field. Then we highlight the features of the corpus we will use to
analyze the interpretive questions addressed in Part IV.
A. The Purpose of Corpus Linguistics
Corpus linguistics is the study of language (linguistics) through
systematic analysis of data derived from large databases of naturally occurring
language (corpora, the plural of corpus, a body of language). Corpus linguists
teach that “the best way to find out about how language works is by analyzing
real examples of language as it is actually used.”119 To gauge the common
meaning of a given phrase, a corpus linguist would examine a large number
of naturally occurring uses of that phrase in a database or corpus of language.
Corpus linguists engage in “both quantitative and qualitative
analy[sis].”120 A “key goal of corpus linguistics is to aim for replicability of
117 Id. at 12.
118 Id.
119 PAUL BAKER, GLOSSARY OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 65 (2006).
120 Douglas Biber, Corpus-Based and Corpus-driven Analyses of Language Variation and Use, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 160 (Bernd Heine & Heiko Narrog eds., 2010).
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results.”121 The point is to preserve “research findings that have much greater
generalizability and validity than would otherwise be feasible.”122 Corpus
linguistic analysis also avoids the Hawthorne Effect—the tendency of people
to alter their behavior when they know they are being observed.123 It does so
by examining preexisting, naturally occurring language.
B. Corpora
The naturally occurring language studied by corpus linguists appears in
databases called corpora. Familiar examples of linguistic corpora are databases
of newspaper articles, books, or legal texts.
Corpus linguists focus on the development of an appropriate corpus. Size
matters, as does representativeness.
A general corpus is aimed at representing a broad speech community, like
an entire country. A special corpus, on the other hand, would aim at capturing
the language of a more limited speech community, such as that spoken in a
region or among those who speak a particular dialect.
A corpus can either be static or dynamic. A historical corpus is static; it
captures language usage from a particular time period. A monitor corpus, by
contrast, is a dynamic one that is continuously updated to track ongoing
developments in language usage.
A corpus may bear embedded linguistic metadata. A parsed corpus, for
example, bears metadata identifying the syntactic characteristics of words.
Other corpora are merely tagged. A tagged corpus contains metadata on the part
of speech borne by each work in the corpus, while a raw corpus includes no
linguistic metadata—just the bare words.
C. Tools
Linguists have developed tools and methods for analyzing language usage
and meaning through systematic searches of such databases. These tools can
yield linguistic insights that are generally not possible “by human linguistic
intuition alone.”124
Corpus linguists analyze frequency data. They can assess how often a
word is used—either over time or across different genres or registers. And

121 TONY MCENERY & ANDREW HARDIE, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: METHOD, THEORY AND
PRACTICE at 66 (2011).
122 Biber, supra note 120, at 159.
123 See generally HENRY A. LANDSBERGER, HAWTHORNE REVISITED: MANAGEMENT AND
THE WORKER, ITS CRITICS, AND DEVELOPMENTS IN HUMAN RELATIONS IN INDUSTRY (1958)
(critiquing the Hawthorne Experiments).
124 Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 88, at 831.
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that may provide insights into meaning.125 Frequency analysis may also
extend to different senses of a given word or phrase. By tabulating the relative
frequencies of different senses of a word or phrase within a corpus, a linguist
can do what a dictionary can’t—discern the more common sense of a given
term in a given linguistic context.
The tabulation of frequency data requires “coding,” or classification of
search results. In corpus linguistics, coding increasingly draws on principles
and practices from survey and content analysis methodologies.126 The first
step is to perform a search in the corpus to identify each instance (or “hit”)
of the word or phrase in question. In the case of a relatively small number of
hits (around 100), the coders may analyze each concordance line; where there
are more hits, the analysis looks at a random sample of results.127
By looking at “concordance lines” of text from a corpus, a linguist can
examine a large number of examples of a given term or phrase in naturally
occurring language. This lets the linguist assemble much more information
than could be derived from a mere dictionary. And it can yield a broad,
representative sample instead of a set of isolated—possibly cherry-picked—
sentences. Sense–distribution coding (from concordance-line analysis) is
arguably the most important use of a corpus; other tools are more exploratory
than confirmatory in nature (or at best provide only weak evidence of
meaning). Such coding is also the most qualitative in nature, thus requiring
the most work. To code the senses of the words and terms we analyzed in this
paper, we read the approximate equivalent of a Harry Potter novel’s worth of
context128—in reading at least a paragraph before and after a word or term.129
Corpus linguists also analyze word meaning or usage by considering a
word’s common collocates. A collocate is a word-neighbor—a word commonly
used in association with another. Common collocation of one word or phrase
with another can tell us something useful about meaning or communicative
content. This is a linguistic phenomenon that has long been embraced by the
law. Our law of interpretation has long embraced the noscitur a sociis canon of
125 TONY MCENERY & ANDREW WILSON, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 82
(2d ed. 2001).
126 See generally James C. Phillips & Jesse Egbert, Advancing Law and Corpus Linguistics:
Importing Principles and Practices from Survey and Content-Analysis Methodologies to Improve Corpus
Design and Analysis, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1589.
127 See EARL BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 206-08 (12th ed. 2010)
(discussing the process of sampling).
128 We read an estimated 150,000 words of context. The average Harry Potter novel was 154,881
words. See How Many Words Are There in the Harry Potter Book Series?, WORDCOUNTER (Nov. 23,
2015), https://wordcounter.net/blog/2015/11/23/10922_how-many-words-harry-potter.html.
129 We sought to follow the methodology laid out in Phillips & Egbert, supra note 126. To that
end, we used two coders (one an author and another a research assistant) to code materials separately
from each other and then compared results.
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construction (“it is known by its associates”).130 And that is reflected in
linguistic analysis through collocation—reflected in the idea that “you shall
know a word by the company it keeps.”131
Corpus linguistic analysis also “looks at variation in somewhat fixed
phrases, which are often referred to as lexical bundles.”132 Generally, lexical
bundles are defined as a repeated series or grouping of three or more words.133
In other linguistic circles these lexical bundles are referred to as N-grams or
clusters. Here, we will refer to them as clusters because this is what they are
referred to in the corpus linguistics software used in this study. (“Do you
want me to” and “I don’t know what” are two of the most common clusters
in conversational English.134) Clusters are “not complete phrases” and “are
statistically defined (identified by their overwhelming co-occurrence).”135
A corpus search allows an analysis not just at the word level but of multiword phrases. It also allows the consideration of syntactic context—by
examination of the term or phrase in question in a particular syntactic
structure, as a noun modified by a particular adjective. So instead of turning
to a dictionary to look up public and use, we can instead look for examples of
public use because a phrase may mean more than the sum of its parts.
Moreover, a corpus search can generate data of relevance to the empirical
question of relative frequency—of how often a given term is used in each of
two (or more) competing senses. After all, if one sense predominates over
another, it’s strong evidence that meaning is how that term or phrase was
most commonly understood at the founding.
Corpus analysis also brings the advantage of transparency. Most people
don’t have access to the founding-era dictionaries (though more are being
placed on Google Books) or to obscure historical sources traditionally relied
on in originalist scholarship and judicial opinions. But anyone with Internet
access can pull up an online corpus and run the same searches and analyze the
same data that was relied on in an article, brief, or opinion. With traditional
originalist tools, there’s a take-my-word-for-it element. But corpus analysis
democratizes the inquiry, opening up the data and the conclusions drawn
from it to everyone. No one has to take the originalist’s word for it. Anyone

130 Noscitur a sociis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
131 JOHN RUPERT FIRTH, A
Synopsis of Linguistic Theory, 1930-1955, in
STUDIES IN LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 11 (1957).
132 GENA R. BENNETT, USING CORPORA IN THE LANGUAGE LEARNING CLASSROOM:
CORPUS LINGUISTICS FOR TEACHERS 9 (2010).
133 Id.; see also DOUG BIBER ET AL., LONGMAN GRAMMAR OF SPOKEN AND WRITTEN
ENGLISH 990 (1999) (“A lexical bundle is defined here as a recurring sequence of three of more words.”).
134 BIBER ET AL., supra note 133, at 994.
135 BENNETT, supra note 132, at 9.
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can look at the same data and try to replicate or falsify the conclusions. This
in itself is progress.
D. COFEA
If we wish to assess the general public usage of a given term in the late
eighteenth century, we would need a database that widely represents usage
across a range of genres—or registers—in the language community of this era.
And we would need a large enough database that a search will reveal enough
“hits” to yield representative samples for frequency, collocation, and
concordance line analysis.
Until recently, no such corpus existed. The Corpus of Historical American
English (COHA) came close. But this corpus traced back only to 1810—a
couple of decades too late for founding-era analysis. COHA also does not
contain legal materials.
This shortcoming will soon be remedied. The Corpus of Founding-Era
American English (COFEA) is currently being developed at the law school at
Brigham Young University. COFEA will cover the period of 1760–1799—the
beginning of the reign of King George III until the death of George Washington.136
COFEA was under construction while we did our analysis, so it wasn’t
yet publicly available.137 But we have had some involvement in its
development, and have been able to tap into its core component parts for the
analysis in this Article. Those parts include the Evans Early Imprint Series,
the National Archives Founders Papers Online project, and materials from
Hein Online. Together these corpora comprise a raw, historical corpus. Viewed
individually, one of them is a general corpus, one is a special corpus (aimed at
assessing language usage in a specialized sub-community or dialect—legal
language), and one is a hybrid of the two.
The Evans Early Imprint Series consists of “nearly two-thirds of all
books, pamphlets, and broadsides known to have been printed in this country
between 1640 to 1821.”138 This is a general, historical corpus. Of the nearly 40,000
titles available in Evans, the University of Michigan’s Text Creation
Partnership worked in cooperation with the owners of the Evans series “to
create 6,000 accurately keyed and fully searchable . . . text editions . . . . [that
are] fully available to the public.”139 The COFEA database that we used for
this Article includes all the searchable Evans texts that fell within the time
period of 1760–99.
BYU Law & Corpus Linguistics, https://lawcorpus.byu.edu.
COFEA is now publicly available. See https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/cofea.
TEXT CREATION PARTNERSHIP, http://www.textcreationpartnership.org/tcp-evans/
[https://perma.cc/9Y6J-48XU] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018).
139 Id.
136
137
138
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The National Archives’ “Founders Online” database contains the
“correspondence and other writings of six major shapers of the United States:
George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams (and family), Thomas
Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison.”140 The Founders Online
collection also contains letters written to these founders by a variety of
Americans, including both other founders and more ordinary citizens. Again,
we limited the date range to 1760–1799. The COFEA database that we used
includes all the Founders Online documents downloaded by the fall of 2015.
The final component of the COFEA database that we used consists of
materials from Hein Online. Hein is partnering with BYU by providing materials
for the creation of COFEA. Our Hein corpus consists of legal materials from 1760–
1799—statutes, case law, legal papers, legislative debates and materials, etc.
The goal was to assemble a corpus that is both large and representative. Our
COFEA corpus as now assembled consists of over 100,000 total texts and over
150 million words. The database is also balanced and representative. It includes
not just legal materials but the writings of ordinary Americans. Evans is
indicative of usage among the general public. Hein, on the other hand, gives us
a window into legal usage. And the Founders Online collection provides
material not available in the other two databases—letters from both founders
and others. Together these component databases give us a pretty
comprehensive picture of language usage at the time of the American founding.
Because the component databases of our COFEA corpus are different,
they can provide a window into comparative usage—to gauge whether a given
term is used one way (or more or less often) in legal materials, and another
in ordinary writings. This may map onto the various subspecies of originalist
analysis. The Evans materials can best give us a sense of usage among
members of the general public. The Founders Online materials, however, may
be of particular interest to original intent inquiries. And the Hein database
may be most useful to those interested in how American lawyers of the
founding era may have understood the language of the Constitution. In other
words, COFEA will be a helpful tool to all originalists. It can yield sample
sentences and data of relevance to original public meaning, original intent, or
original legal meaning.141
We acknowledge, however, that COFEA is not perfectly representative of our
target speech community—the American public during the founding era—in at
least three ways. First, the speech represented in COFEA comes overwhelming
from white males. That means that both women and nonwhites (principally blacks
and American Indians) are underrepresented. That could matter if the language
140 Founders Online, National Archives,
https://founders.archives.gov/ [https://perma.cc/GD48-CDCH] (last visited October 16, 2018).
141 We recognize that it may not be equally helpful for all those inquiries.
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usage of founding-era women and nonwhites differed from usage among white
men. And COFEA cannot answer that empirical question.
Second, and a related point, COFEA is representative of mostly elite
voices. Even documents in the Evans materials and letters written by more
ordinary folk in the Founders’ materials are written by educated people who
have at least some societal prominence—sufficient to get a book published or
beg for a job from George Washington. Not everyone could read at the time
the Constitution was ratified.142 And even those who could did not always
have their writings preserved. Societal elites were much more likely to have
their writings saved and digitized than those lower on the social ladder. And
this is another sense in which COFEA is imperfectly representative (though
we hasten to add that this is hardly a defect unique to COFEA—this is always
a problem in dealing with historical documents).
Third, COFEA doesn’t contain sufficient samples of every genre of
English-language document at the founding. One current glaring omission is
newspapers. Although this is less serious than in a modern corpus because of
the nature of founding-era newspapers—a collection of articles, letters,
essays, etc., rather than news articles written in a distinctive style—it is still
an omission. Similarly, COFEA doesn’t currently have the state ratification
debates—an especially important source for those who look to the ratifiers’
understanding for constitutional meaning.
Thus, COFEA isn’t perfect in its representativeness. But it’s a vast
improvement over current sources, and the best tool we currently have.143
There is an additional virtue worth highlighting: the overwhelming majority
of the documents in COFEA were not created by their authors in an attempt
to understand the Constitution’s meaning, and the documents were not
selected for inclusion in COFEA with any constitutional question in mind,
but were in fact selected by others—the editors of the National Archives’
Founders Papers Project, the editors of the Evans Early American Imprint
Series, and the editors of Hein Online. These are important features (not
bugs). The materials in COFEA yield a true window into linguistic meaning.
Materials revealing debates and discussion of the Constitution itself may be
142 At least one scholar has estimated that literacy among white males in New England was
about ninety percent during the time period of 1787–1795, and about forty-eight percent for white
New England women during that same time. See KENNETH A. LOCKRIDGE, LITERACY IN
COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 39 (1979).
143 We also note that not all the tools of COFEA are fully operative. The underlying metadata,
for example, is not yet fully entered. For that reason, a year-delimited search is not yet fully available.
This could be significant, particularly if a word or phrase that is used in the Constitution impacts
usage patterns in the greater society (in a manner influencing sense distributions). For this reason,
it seems important to be able to cut off the inquiry at 1787, or at least to be able to compare results
before and after the Constitution was made public. This function is not a currently available function
in COFEA; but it should be available in time.
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helpful to discern original intent. But they can also be misleading if the point
of the inquiry is the communicative content of the Constitution’s words.
People engaged in debate, after all, will not always be aiming to convey the
semantic meaning of the words of a legal document; their goal may be more
political.144 COFEA, in this sense, is essentially “double-blind”—both the
creator and the compiler of the documents had no idea that these documents
would be used to investigate specific constitutional questions. And in that
sense, it reduces the potential for bias in the originalist inquiry.
IV. DATA-DRIVEN ANALYSIS
The previous discussion sets the stage for the need and basis for datadriven analysis of the communicative content of terms of the Constitution.
Here we show how that can be done.
We present replicable, falsifiable data of relevance to the likely
communicative content of provisions of the Constitution in the late
eighteenth century. The goal is to respond to the limitations of existing
methods of assessing original communicative content. We show how corpus
analysis allows for an assessment of communicative content in light of a wider
range of semantic context, provides information of relevance to
disambiguation of polysemy, and can focus on the relevant timeframe.
We employ the databases in our COFEA corpus to analyze four clauses of the
Constitution considered above—the Domestic Violence Clause, the Commerce
Clause, the public use proviso in the Takings Clause, and the Natural Born Citizen
Clause. And we present corpus linguistic analysis of each of these provisions.
A. Domestic Violence
We begin with a relatively clear-cut example—domestic violence. The
communicative content of this clause has never been litigated. But scholars
have helpfully identified it as a term that has experienced linguistic drift.
Today the term is almost always used to refer to “violent or aggressive
behavior within the home, esp[ecially] violent abuse of a partner.”145 Yet at
the founding, this phrase apparently carried a different meaning; it was
understood as a reference to insurrection, rebellion, or rioting within a state
(in contrast to domestic tranquility in the Preamble).
That seems uncontroversial. It feels consistent with our linguistic
intuition (and confirmed by the semantic context of the Domestic Violence
144 Granted, there are a few materials like this in COFEA, but they are pretty rare given
COFEA’s make-up.
145 Domestic Violence, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY: ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/
[https://perma.cc/4TU8-7HWR] (added March 2006).
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Clause, which appears in a provision in Article IV that provides not only for
protection of a state against “domestic Violence” but also “against
Invasion”146). But can we know that this is correct? We can look up “domestic”
and “violence” in founding-era dictionaries and come up with an
understanding that is consistent with our modern construct of the phrase
“domestic violence.”147 How can we be sure that a guarantee for federal
protection “against domestic violence” would not have been understood as an
assurance of protection against assaults on a member of a person’s household?
Perhaps our intuition tells us otherwise. And we could find isolated examples
of the full phrase “domestic violence” that might seem to override the dictionary
definitions of the component parts of the phrase. But how can we trust our intuition
of a dialect that is so far removed from our current language community? And how
can we be confident that the sample sentences we find are representative, and not
cherry-picked (and the product of motivated reasoning)?
The answer is that we can assemble a data set of the eighteenth-century
usage of “domestic violence” that is both transparent and falsifiable. And that
data set can give us an empirical basis for (or disprove) our intuition.
We performed the relevant analysis and have confirmed the above
intuition. Our data show that domestic violence today is almost always used in
reference to an assault on a member of a person’s household, but the term
was a reference to an insurrection or rebellion in the late eighteenth century.
To show this, we used both the beta version of COFEA and also the Corpus
of Historical American English (COHA). And we first assembled some
frequency data, which show that domestic violence was used infrequently in the
founding era and for many, many decades after—up to the decade of the 1980s:
Figure 1: Domestic Violence Frequency in COHA & COFEA
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U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
The sense of domestic meaning “[o]f or belonging to the home, house, or household;
pertaining to one’s place of residence or family affairs; household, home, ‘family’” entered the
English lexicon by at least the early 1600s. Domestic, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, sense 2a (2d
ed. 1989). And the sense of violence meaning “[t]he exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury
on, or cause damage to, persons or property; action or conduct characterized by this; treatment or
usage tending to cause bodily injury or forcibly interfering with personal freedom” entered the
English lexicon by the early 1300s. Violence, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, sense 1a.
146
147
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The frequency data does not tell us anything about the meaning of
domestic violence. It could just mean that a term previously irrelevant suddenly
became relevant due to changes in society. But the pattern does point towards
something to investigate further. So to explore why there is such an uptick in
use of the term, we next turn to collocates. We divide the analysis on the lines
of the two time periods displayed by the above pattern—the long period of
consistent but limited usage (1760–1979) and the recent period of much more
frequent usage (1980–2009). Our collocation analysis showed the following:

Table 1: Domestic Violence Collocates

1760-1979
Collocate
Against
State(s)
Protect*
Convened
Invasion
Suppress*
Legislature
Foreign
Congress
Article
United
President
Insurrection(s)
Constitution(al)
Application
Conditions
Aid

Number
50
23
23
17
13
11
11
9
9
8
6
5
5
5
5
4
4

1980-2009
Collocate
Women
Abuse(d)
Honor
National
Victims
Killings
Coalition
Issues
Violence
Domestic
Cases
Issue
Law
Ordinary
Sexual
Drug
Services
Rate
County
Support
Police
Battered
Rape
Statistics
Shelter

Number
30
13
11
11
11
9
9
9
8
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
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Murder
4
Race
4
Studies
4
Project
4
Group
4
* = all tenses of the verb; minimum of 4 results

The difference in collocates of the same term in the two different periods
is as striking as the frequency usage in the two different periods. For most of
our history, domestic violence has been associated with states, invasion, various
forms of the verb suppress, insurrection, and other political actors or terms.
Yet in the later period, domestic violence has nothing to do with the earlier
associations, instead being associated with women, abuse, victims, things
sexual, and rape. This is confirmed by a comparison of the most frequent
noun (state(s) v. women), verb (protect vs. abuse), and adjective collocate
(foreign vs. national) from each period. Clearly the collocates of the term, and
thus its semantic context, has dramatically shifted. This points towards a
concurrent shift in meaning of domestic violence, but to confirm that we need
to code the senses of the term.
The surest way to document linguistic drift is to code for the sense being
used and see the pattern that emerges over time by reading the term in
context from a concordance line search. As with the collocates, we compared
the percentage of the two senses (as well as whether it was some third sense
or ambiguous) based on the two time periods. And we saw drastic differences
in frequency of usage:
Figure 2: Percentage of Senses of Domestic Violence, COHA & COFEA

98.33%

96.39%

0.00% 0.00% 1.67%
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It’s hard to imagine a starker contrast. We never found a clear use of the
family abuse sense of the term until the 1980s. And since 1980, the
insurrection sense—the dominant sense for over two centuries—almost
completely vanishes, being used once in the early 1980s, and then never
appearing again in COHA. This wasn’t linguistic drift; it was linguistic
divorce. The corpus data back up the intuition that the Constitution isn’t
speaking of family abuse when it uses the term domestic violence.
B. Commerce
The Constitution grants power to Congress to “regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States.”148 The word commerce presents a different set of
challenges than those noted above under domestic violence. Here we can look
up the operative term in founding-era dictionaries—subject, of course, to all
the shortcomings catalogued in subsection II.B.1 above. But we face the
polysemy problem—of competing senses, with no indication of which one to
attribute to the constitutional context. And without some corpus data we will
have a difficult time disambiguating the polysemous text.
Before exploring the data, we describe the various senses discussed in the
literature that we coded for:
1. Sense 1: the trading, bartering, buying, and selling of goods (and the
incidents of transporting those goods within the definition)
2. Sense 2: the production of goods for trade; manufacturing
3. Sense 3: any market-based activity having an economic component
(this would include trade, manufacturing, agriculture, labor, and services)
4. Sense 4: all forms of social and economic intercourse between
persons, including, but not limited to, traffic (i.e., trade)
5. Sense 5: indeterminate
We also coded for whether there was some other sense of commerce not
discussed in legal scholarship, but we didn’t find an additional sense.
One complication here is that these senses are not mutually exclusive.
While the trade sense and the production sense may be distinct, they both
could fit within the broad market-based economic-activity sense. And the
trade sense also fits within the broader intercourse sense. A Venn diagram
helps illustrate the overlap between the senses.149

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
While this overlap may appear to complicate the analysis, it can make coding easier. For
instance, if something is not the trade sense, it cannot be the market-based economic activity or
social- and economic-intercourse sense either, and so it must be the manufacturing sense.
148
149
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Figure 3: Polysemy Venn Diagram

1. Frequency
Turning to the data, we first looked at the frequency of the use of commerce
across the three smaller corpora of COFEA—Evans, Founders, and Hein—
we are using. Again, to standardize the comparison, we use words per million.
Figure 4: Frequency of Commerce by Corpus

Per million wordrs

Frequency of commerce by corpus
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99.8

0

Evans (ordinary)

Founders

Legal

While no one that we’re aware of has argued that commerce is a legal termof-art, it appears twice as frequently in legal contexts as in ordinary ones. Of
course, a word can have an ordinary meaning but appear more often in legal
than ordinary contexts. The word police might be an example of that. To more
confidently determine whether a word is a legal term-of-art, we would need
to compare sense distributions across genres of material. If we saw one sense
of a word appearing ninety-five percent of the time a word is used in legal
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materials, for example, but almost never in ordinary materials, then we could
conclude that the term has a distinct term-of-art sense in the law.
Also of note, commerce appears most frequently in the letters of founders,
which may not be overly surprising given their letters were focused on
running the military and the government. But since this does not appear to
be a scenario where we have two competing senses with one being legal and
one being ordinary, this frequency distribution does not shed much light on
which sense of commerce is the most common.
2. Collocates
We next analyze the top thirty collocates of commerce using COFEA.150
We do so not because collocate analysis is the best tool for determining the
meaning of words, but because it can point us in directions to further explore.
We thus turn to exploratory tools before confirmatory ones, recognizing that
a very strong finding on an exploratory tool could rise to the level of a weak
confirmation of meaning.
Table 2: Commerce Collocates

RANK
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

COLLOCATES
AMITY
INTERDICTING
FRANCOAMERICAN
EXEMPTIONS
RECAPTURES
SPOLIATIONS
MANUFAAURES
AGRI
MANUFADURES
VIGATION

FREQUENCY
939
10
11

MIS151
7.94
7.06
6.99

PERCENT152
46%
25%
24%

ALL153
2,032
40
46

96
13
138
13
25
12
12

6.95
6.93
6.84
6.83
6.81
6.76
6.76

23%
23%
21%
21%
21%
20%
20%

415
57
643
61
119
59
59

150 Our collocate search span was six words to the right and left of commerce. We removed
foreign words from the results.
151 Mutual Information Score. See Kenneth Ward Church & Patrick Hanks, Word Association
Norms, Mutual Information, and Lexicography, 16 COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 22, 23 (1990)
(explaining that a mutual information score “compares the probability of observing [word] x and
[word] y together (the joint probability) with the probabilities of observing [word] x and
[word] y independently (chance)”).
152 This is the percent of all the instances a particular collocate occurs in the COFEA that it
appears nears commerce.
153 This is the total number of times a particular collocate appeared in COFEA.
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25
26
27
28
29
30

CONCLURE
SHACKLE
LIAISONS
AGRICULTURE
NAVIGATION
MANUFA
AGRICUL
ILLICIT
DEPREDATIONS
INTERDICT
NAVIGA
SHACKLED
RELATIVEMENT
VEXATIONS
STAGNATION
MONOPOLIZE
INTERDICTED
CONCLU
MANUFACTURES
SPOLIATION
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12
13
19
576
1,457
38
15
63
278
10
14
14
21
37
31
15
15
26
682
11

6.67
6.65
6.54
6.51
6.41
6.38
6.36
6.04
6.03
6
5.96
5.95
5.88
5.85
5.84
5.83
5.77
5.76
5.74
5.7

19%
19%
17%
17%
16%
16%
15%
12%
12%
12%
12%
12%
11%
11%
11%
11%
10%
10%
10%
10%

A few patterns emerge that shed some, but not a lot, of light on the
interpretive question at hand. First, the highest-ranked collocate—meaning
the collocate that appears more often near commerce than near other words—
was amity. (Its raw frequency was also very high.) This is due to the context
of treaties of Amity and Commerce that the United States entered into with
various nations. These weren’t treaties to increase the social intercourse
between nations, nor to increase some kind of joint manufacturing or
agricultural ventures between countries. They were treaties of trade.
A few other collocates seem related to the trade sense of commerce. For
instance, navigation in some form appears four times, and while navigation
can be related to some of the other senses, it would be to transport goods and
thus would be for trade. Other collocates that appear to be more related to
trade than the other senses include Franco-American (likely on the context of
a trade agreement or alliance), recaptures, shackle(d), liaisons, illicit,

63
69
109
3,375
9,137
243
97
510
2,275
83
120
121
190
343
289
141
146
256
6,816
113
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depredations,154 and spoliation.155 This is all very soft evidence that the trade
sense of commerce might be the most common one in the founding era. Taken
alone, these findings are insufficient to answer the communicative content
question at hand.156
3. Clusters (or n-grams)
Another way to parse the data is to explore clusters (or n-grams). Below
we report the ten most frequent 3-, 4-, and 5-word clusters where commerce is
on the far left or far right.157
Table 3: Commerce N-Gram

Commerce on the left
(3-word cluster)

Freq. Commerce on the right
(3-word cluster)

Freq.

commerce, and

1401

treaty of commerce

1187

commerce of the
commerce and
navigation
commerce with the
commerce between the
commerce, which
commerce. The
commerce, the

1104
618

of our commerce
committee of commerce

653
595

427
296
275
262
255

amity and commerce
trade and commerce
of the commerce
on our commerce
navigation and
commerce
treaties of commerce

553
405
375
314
277

commerce and
manufactures

243

277

154 ”The act of making a prey of; plundering, pillaging, ravaging; . . . an act of spoliation and
robbery.” Depredation, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY: ONLINE.
155 ”The act of spoliating, despoiling, pillaging, or plundering; seizure of goods or property by
violent means; depredation, robbery.” Spoliation, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY: ONLINE.
156 Another way to do collocate analysis, besides the word of interest, is to compare the
collocate patterns to potential synonyms, such as trade and manufacturing (and variations of the
term). We found that trade shares six top-thirty collocates with commerce, often similarly ranked:
illicit (4th); interdicting (5th); exemptions (10th); monopolize (11th); naviga (27th); and stagnation (29th).
On the other hand, manufacturing shares just two—agri (7th) and agriculture (14th)—and further
exploration shows they are actually just evidence that the three often appear together in a list. Thus,
the fact that commerce and trade have more overlap in collocate networks than commerce and
manufacturing do is evidence that the trade sense is likely more common than the manufacturing
sense.
157 The corpus software we used counted punctuation as a word.
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commerce; and
Commerce on the left
(4-word cluster)
commerce of the united
commerce and
navigation.
commerce, and
navigation
commerce, and the
commerce and
navigation,
commerce with Great
Britain
commerce and
manufactures,
commerce between the
two
commerce with foreign
nations
commerce, and to
Commerce on the left
(5-word cluster)
commerce of the United
States
commerce, and
navigation,
commerce between the
United States
commerce with the
United States
commerce between the
two countries
commerce with foreign
nations,
commerce and
navigation. -LSB-

190

253

244

amity, commerce
Commerce on the right
(4-word cluster)
the committee of
commerce
a treaty of commerce

174

of amity and commerce

534

173
167

the treaty of commerce
of amity, commerce

323
248

166

the protection of
commerce
of trade and commerce

198

532

107
106
106
105

510
127
87
78
67
65
64

depredations on our
commerce
of navigation and
commerce
no treaty of commerce
Commerce on the right
(5-word cluster)
treaty of amity and
commerce
treaty of amity,
commerce
to the committee of
commerce
of the treaty of
commerce
for the protection of
commerce
of the committee of
commerce
of a treaty of commerce

566
553

95
85
80
74

425
236
206
141
121
88
70
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Britain,
commerce with the
defence of
commerce and
navigation. Statement

61
50
42
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make a treaty of
commerce
from the committee of
commerce
that the committee of
commerce

70
65
63

A few interesting patterns emerge. First, some of the most common words
that follow commerce in these clusters when it is on the left are with and
between, and they are often followed by some proper noun representing a
polity. These two words would fit with a sense of trade or intercourse, but not
manufacturing or all economic activity that would include things like
agriculture or labor.
Second, a few clusters point towards areas of additional research: treaties of
commerce, committees of commerce, and protection of commerce. What did
these treaties cover? What did these committees do vis-à-vis commerce? How
was commerce protected? The answers to these questions will shed further light
on what commerce meant during the time period. Relatedly, and as noted
above, the idea of a treaty with another country over agriculture, domestic labor,
or manufacturing seems odd. A treaty over trade, however, does not.
Third, certain three-word patterns emerge, such as commerce and
navigation, or amity and commerce. Sometimes such word patterns are not
interchangeable in their order, which can indicate a specialized meaning. In
linguistics, these types of phrases or groupings of words are often referred to
as binomials or multinomials. A binomial is “a coordinated pair of linguistics
units of the same word class which show some semantic relation,” and is often,
but not limited to, a noun pair.158 An example of this from legal language
would be cease and desist or aid and abet, which are sometimes called legal
doublets.159 “Multinomials are similarly chained by semantic and syntactic
links, but consist of longer sequences of related words.”160 Examples include
hold, defend, and favor or lock, stock, and barrel.161 Binomials have been found
to be characteristic of legal language and have been observed to be five times
more frequent in modern legal writing than nonlegal writing, making
158 Joanna Kopaczyk & Hans Sauer, Defining and Exploring Binomials, in BINOMIALS IN THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH: FIXED AND FLEXIBLE 1, 3 (Joanna Kopaczyk & Hans Sauer eds., 2017).
159 See BRYAN A. GARNER, THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON STYLE 192-94 (2d ed. 2006)
(explaining that “[t]he doublet and triplet phrasing common in Middle English still survives in legal
writing, especially contracts, wills, and trusts,” including the phrases “aid and abet” and “cease and desist”).
160 Anu Lehto, Binomials and Multinomials in Early Modern Parliamentary Acts, in BINOMIALS,
supra note 158, at 262.
161 Kopaczyk & Sauer, supra note 158, at 3.
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binomial usage “clearly a style marker in law language.”162 Examples of
multinomials in legal language include give, devise and bequeath or right, title,
and interest. This frequent occurrence of binomials and multinomials in legal
writing is because of their ability to “increase the precision and allinclusiveness of the documents, although they are also used for stylistic
reasons and belong among the key features of the genre.”163 If the clusters
found in this paper are binomials and multinomials, then it is likely that at
the time they were used they had become or were in the process of becoming
technical or legal terms of art.164
Finally, we noted some larger multinomials of interest. For instance, the
multinomial amity, commerce, and navigation occurred 153 times, no doubt in
the context of treaties. Substituting in trade for commerce makes sense in that
multinomial, but substituting synonyms for other senses makes less sense,
particularly in a treaty context:
1. amity, manufacturing, and navigation (not implausible, but amity and
navigation seem to have less to do with manufacturing than trade);

162 Marita Gustafsson, The Syntactic Features of Binomial Expressions in Legal English, 4 TEXTINTERDISC. J. FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOURSE 123, 125 (1984).
163 Lehto, supra note 160, at 261; see also VIJAY KUMAR BHATIA, ANALYSING GENRE: LANGUAGE
USE IN PROFESSIONAL SETTINGS 108 (1993) (explaining that “[e]xpressions like these . . . [are] an
extremely effective linguistic device to make the legal document precise as well as all inclusive.”).
164 We thus investigated the most frequent clusters that appeared as though they might be
binomials, examining them in reverse order as well. As the table below shows, ordering usually matters.

Table 4: Clusters
Selected Clusters
amity and commerce
commerce and amity
agriculture and commerce
commerce and agriculture
manufactures/ing and commerce
commerce and manufactures/ing
navigation and commerce
commerce and navigation
trade and commerce
commerce and trade

Freq
553
7
81
54
90
250
277
618
405
24

While agriculture and commerce are used somewhat interchangeably when in a binomial or
doublet, they do not occur relatively equally regardless of order. For example, trade and commerce
appears nearly 17 times more often than commerce and trade. And amity and commerce appear a
staggering 79 times more often than commerce and amity. This may mean that some of these doublets
have begun to take on a meaning that is more than the sum of their semantic parts. Both collocate
and concordance line analysis of these binomials could help show if this is the case.
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2 amity, agriculture/manufacturing/domestic labor, and navigation (again
possible, but not as good of a fit given the items substituted for commerce seem
less relevant to the other two items on the list);
3. amity, all social and economic intercourse, and navigation (the social
intercourse aspect seems out of place with navigation).
And the multinomial agriculture, commerce, and ___ occurred 49 times in
COFEA, with the following terms making up that last word:
Table 5: Multinomials

agriculture, commerce, and ___
manufactures
(the) arts/all the arts (of peace)
trades
industry
navigation
domestic economy
everything useful
fisheries
literature
mechanics
policies
political relations

Freq
31
4
3
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

The fact that about two-thirds of the time this multinomial occurs as
agriculture, commerce, and manufactures would point towards a trade sense of
commerce: the manufacturing sense would be redundant; an all market-based
economic activity would also be redundant because it would already include
agriculture and manufacturing; and all social and economic intercourse seems
too broad as the social-intercourse aspect would be out of place in a list with
agriculture and manufacturing. Also, the fact that no word found in that final
slot was synonymous with trade further bolsters a trade-sense of commerce in
that multinomial.
4. Sense Differentiation
The last point of our analysis of commerce is our coding of the senses we
found sampling concordance lines. This is the meat-and-potatoes of
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determining meaning from corpus analysis—the previous tools (pure
frequency data, collocates, and clusters) pale in comparison in the insight they
add (if any) to the inquiry into communicative content. In other words, we
saved the most important tool for last. Below are our results.165
Figure 5: Commerce Sense Distribution
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The results here are consistent with the analysis we’ve seen from the
collocates and clusters: the trade-sense of commerce appears to be the
dominant sense. This is especially so in the Legal (Hein) and Founders
corpora, where the other senses are nonexistent or hardly appear in our
random sample. As might be expected, in more ordinary contexts (the Evans
Corpus), the trade sense appears slightly less often than the context being
indeterminate,166 and the other senses occur the most, though still much less
than the trade sense.
165 The word commerce appeared in the three smaller corpora as follows: Evans (5330), Founders
(10,071), and Hein (9,600). We then randomly sampled 125 instances from each of these three smaller
corpora, sampling based on document rather than instance of commerce. We used two coders, making
sure they had at least seventy percent agreement on practice materials before coding the random
sample. For more on coding methodology, see generally Phillips & Egbert, supra note 126.
166 A search result was coded indeterminate if, after reading the surrounding context (usually
at least reading the equivalent of a paragraph before and after the word), one of three things
occurred: (1) there was not enough information to code a sense; (2) we couldn’t tell between two or
more competing senses; (3) we leaned towards one sense, but were not confident enough to say that
it’s that sense (we called these “leaners”).
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We also combined the results that were indeterminate but leaning towards
a sense with those coded as a particular sense to see how that might change
the sense distribution.
Figure 6: Commerce Sense Distribution by Corpus with “Leaners”
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Adding the instances where we leaned towards a sense to instances where
we were more confident that was the particular sense shows even stronger
evidence that the trade sense is the most common sense across corpus genres.
And it makes sense that the Evans results would look different than the other
two corpora. While the Founders materials are not legal in nature—they’re
mostly letters—they were on topics that had a much higher overlap with the
Legal Corpus (running a country and the military) than the Evans Corpus.
This suggests that the genre alone may not make a difference, but that the
substance of the genre also matters.
Thus, the trade sense of commerce seems confirmed by collocation
patterns, cluster patterns, and sense distribution. This triangulation of all the
tools of the corpus pointing, some more strongly than others, at the same
meaning increases our confidence in the results. Of course, further research
could be done. One could look at the sense distribution just in the narrow
context of when some version of the phrase “regulate commerce” occurs. The
value of a corpus is the ability to slice and dice context to get to the most
relevant semantic context for the inquiry.
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C. Public Use
We next turn to the term public use as found in the Constitution’s Takings
Clause. The relevant constitutional language states: “nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”167 As illustrated
in the Kelo decision, and discussed above, there are several traditional tools
we could use to discern the meaning of the term. Our linguistic intuition
might indicate that public use means something the public actually gets to use.
Yet individual intuition is based on the corpus of English we have in our head,
a corpus that is highly idiosyncratic and highly modern. We could turn to
founding era dictionaries, but we will then have to deal with all the problems
we’ve highlighted above, including perhaps the biggest one in this context:
the term doesn’t appear and must be constructed from its constituent parts—
public and use. Finally, we could rely on a handful of examples of usage of the
term from founding-era sources, such as the Federalist Papers. But that would
only give us a likely unrepresentative sample too small in size to generalize
from to American English usage at the time. So we could get an answer, but
not one we could have any confidence was actually correct.
1. Frequency
The first mode of analysis in peeling back the communicative content of
public use in more rigorous fashion is to compare the frequency of occurrence
of this term across the three smaller corpora that make up COFEA.168 A term
that occurs much more frequently in the Evans Corpus, with its more
ordinary genre of documents from (at least some) more ordinary users of
English, than in the Legal Corpus (Hein) would perhaps indicate a term that
has an ordinary meaning. And the reverse might indicate a term that has a
legal meaning, or at least a meaning that is more common in a legal context
(though sense distribution is what more confidently answers this question).
To standardize the comparison since the three corpora are not identical in
size, we report the frequency per million words:

U.S. CONST., amend. V.
Due to nonstandardized spelling in the Founding era, we used the following search: public*
use*. This picked up alternate spellings, such as publick, as well as the plural form of use.
167
168
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Figure 7: Frequency of Public Use by Corpus
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Public use occurs six times more frequently in legal language than ordinary
language, and three-and-a-half times more frequently in Founders’ letters
than in other types of ordinary documents authored by, on average, less elite
folks. This is evidence that the term either has a legal meaning, or at least has
more relevance to a legal context compared to an ordinary one. But we can’t
tell which is the explanation because these results suffer from observational
equivalence—the phenomenon in which two things that are distinct appear
outwardly to be the same. Only widely disparate sense distributions across
materials (ordinary v. legal) will provide evidence of a legal term-of-art.
2. Sense Differentiation
While we did collocate and cluster (n-gram) analysis on public use, the
results did not shed any light on which sense was most common at the
founding. This is not surprising since both of those tools tend to be more
exploratory than confirmatory in nature. So we next turn to the most
important type of corpus analysis: the hard work of qualitatively analyzing
concordance lines. And for legal questions, this type of analysis seems the
most relevant and most likely to provide useful data.
Based on Justice Thomas’s discussion in Kelo of the potential meanings of
public use at the Founding, we used the following categories:
1. Sense 1: government, military, or public owns or directly employs for
a purpose
2. Sense 2: increases the convenience of or helps in some way the
government or public, including indirect benefits; i.e., broad public purpose
3. Sense 3: some other meaning
4. Sense 4: indeterminate
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We were not just coding for the senses discussed in Kelo, since that
discussion may not have completely or accurately captured founding-era
senses; instead we left the door open to other possible meanings of the term
not discussed. And, in fact, we found one: a sense that appears to mean
“making known to the public” or “or obtaining some kind of public
advantage,” and was used in the context of information or documents of some
kind.169 This is not a sense one could necessarily construct from dictionary
definitions, nor that anyone was discussing. So we were not just using the
corpus data to falsify others’ theories of meanings, but also to look for
meaning.
Below we report the sense distribution we found in the sampled material.
We present the material both centered around the results in each corpus as
well as centered around each sense.170
Figure 8: Distribution of Senses of Public Use by Sense
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An example is in the Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Madison (May 19, 1788):
“The language of the Antifederalists is, that if all the other states adopt, New York
ought still to hold out. I have the most direct intelligence, but in a manner which
forbids a public use being made of it, that Clinton has, in several conversations,
declared his opinion of the inutility of the UNION.”

in 9 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 430, 431 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 2nd ed.
1904) (1886). This sense of public use may have some similarities to a sense of the term found in
patent-law doctrine. See The Act July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117. But the usages we found had
nothing to do with patents or inventions.
170 We searched for the following terms: public use, public uses, publick use, and publick uses. We
found the following totals for each of the smaller corpora: Evans (86), Founders (237), and Hein
(460). We coded all but 3 of the results from Evans (one was a typo and so not public use and the
other two quoted the Constitution). We randomly sampled 125 from Founders and Hein, coding all
the Founders sample and all but one from Hein (the excluded sample quoted the Constitution).
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The direct sense that Justice Thomas argued for is much more common
than the broader, indirect sense that the Kelo majority adopted. Depending
on the corpus, the direct sense is 5.3 times (Evans), 53 times (Founders), or
infinitely (Legal) more common than the indirect, broad sense. In fact, a third
sense—”making information public; gaining public advantage through
revealing something”—was more common than the indirect sense.
These findings come with the caveat that we coded almost as many hits as
indeterminate as we coded as direct. And any inquiry into the communicative
content of public use would therefore require us to decide what to make of all
the ambiguity. It is theoretically possible that all the hits we coded as
indeterminate could have been an example of the indirect sense of the term,
making the distribution of the two senses about equal. That’s why we also
coded the sense we were leaning towards when we thought the usage was
indeterminate (more on that below).
Figure 9: Distribution of Senses of Public Use by Corpus
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The distributions of senses across the various corpora also highlights a
point we noted above: the direct sense predominates even more in a legal
context than in more ordinary ones, though the other two senses are still not
common in ordinary contexts. Again, however, the high level of
indeterminacy clouds these results. Below we combine the instances where
we were confident enough to assign a sense with the instances where we
leaned towards a sense, but thought the use was sufficiently indeterminate
(sometimes even then we didn’t lean to a particular sense).
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Figure 10: Distribution of Public Use Senses by Corpus With “Leaners”
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When we leaned toward a sense in an indeterminate context, we leaned
overwhelmingly toward the first sense. By treating those results we coded as
indeterminate but leaning towards a sense as having coded the result as the sense,
the likelihood of public use being used in the direct compared to the indirect sense
ranges from 5.7 times (Evans), to 29.3 times (Founders), to 97.8 times (Legal) more
likely. We don’t necessarily take a position on where the line is to determine that a
particular sense is the operative one.171 One could imagine the line-drawing could
be just if the differences between the percentages of the coded sense are larger than
the margin of error, and therefore are statistically significant. Or one could imagine
a higher standard where the percentage of a particular sense must reach a certain
threshold (or the ratio between one sense and the next highest sense as to be a
certain minimum value). The data here would likely be clear under any standard.
For reasons noted above it is unclear whether the direct sense of public use
is a legal term-of-art. (The fact that the direct sense is the predominate sense
in ordinary texts as well probably reduces the odds it’s a legal term.) But given
that the Constitution is a legal text, the fact that in the legal materials of
COFEA (as well as the Founders’ letters) the direct sense is even more
common than the indirect sense compared to ordinary materials is further
evidence as to what the Constitution’s communicative content is for the term
public use. Thus, while perhaps we can only speak of probabilities here, the
evidence is strong that Justice Thomas was correct: when the Constitution
uses the term public use it means the government, military, or public owns or

171 It could be possible to import standards of proof from criminal or civil contexts, though
scholars and courts would still need to figure out numbers for what is beyond a reasonable doubt or
a preponderance of the evidence, for example. This would be somewhat arbitrary, though the .05
cut-off for statistical significance in the sciences is also arbitrary.
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directly employs the item for a purpose, rather than the indirect-, broadbenefit sense the Kelo majority proposed.
D. Natural Born
Except for those who were already “a Citizen of the United States at the time
of the Adoption of th[e] Constitution,” only a person who is “a natural born
Citizen” of the United States “shall be eligible to the Office of President.”172 Here
we run into the same dilemmas we faced with domestic violence and public use if we
rely on traditional originalist tools: we’re stuck with looking up two different words
in problematic founding-era dictionaries, relying on a few examples of the term in
context, or checking our modern, idiosyncratic linguistic gut. And it’s not clear what
the latter would tell us—perhaps that the term refers to those not born via Csection? Again, without a properly designed corpus with its tools, the confidence
we’ll have in the answer to what that term meant in the Constitution in the
founding era will be quite limited.
Below we report the frequency of natural born across corpora, which may shed
light on whether the term is an ordinary one, a legal one, or perhaps has some other
specialized meaning (though frequency data cannot fully answer the question).

Occurrences per
millons words

Figure 11: Natural Born Frequency Per Million Words by Corpus
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The results are not surprising given the types of definitions we note
below: natural born is more common in legal contexts than in more ordinary
ones, 2.75–2.87 times more frequent. If there were both a legal and nonlegal
sense of natural born, this would lead us to believe that the odds of the legal
sense being the operative one in the Constitution are increased by these
findings; but that can only be confirmed by analyzing the sense distribution.

172

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
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Yet here all the senses seem to be legal. Based on scholarship in the area,173
we created the following sense categories for natural born:
1. Sense 1: someone born in sovereign territory, no matter the status of
their parents (including those born outside of sovereign territory to
diplomats)
2. Sense 2: someone born outside of sovereign territory to a natural
born father174
3. Sense 3: someone whose natural born status is bestowed by legislative
act
4. Category 4: indeterminate
We also coded for the possibility that natural born was being used in some
other sense but found no such examples. All these senses appear to be legal
in nature—there does not appear to be an ordinary sense of the term. Thus,
to try to answer the question of which legal sense is the operative one, we
turn to the sense distribution from concordance line analysis.175
Figure 12: Natural Born Sense Distribution by Sense
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173 See generally Thomas H. Lee, Natural Born Citizen, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 327 (2017); Mary
Brigid McManamon, The Natural Born Citizen Clause as Originally Understood, 64 CATH. U.L. REV.
317 (2015); Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 73 (1997); Michael D. Ramsey, The Original Meaning of “Natural Born”, 20 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 199 (2017).
174 This sometimes included a grandfather or just parents generically.
175 Collocate and cluster (n-gram) analysis did not yield results that helped answer which sense
was more common.
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The percentage of the time the use of natural born was too indeterminate
to confidently code as a particular sense is extremely high. This severely
undermines the ability to draw much, if any, of a conclusion from the data.176
Figure 13: Natural Born Sense by Corpus
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When looking at the results based on the corpus, interestingly, even
though the three senses of natural born all seem to be legal ones, the lowest
indeterminacy occurs in corpus with the most ordinary materials and authors.
Perhaps that’s because the most common legal sense of natural born was
sufficiently known in ordinary contexts, but the lesser known legal senses had
not seeped in as much into ordinary Founding-era American English.
We next report the results when the leaning senses, noted when we
primarily think the use of natural born is indeterminate, are included with
instances where we didn’t think it was indeterminate (or at least sufficiently
so to code it as such). Sometimes, with leaners, it was clear it was not the
legislative-bestowal sense, but we could not tell whether the likely sense was
location- or parent-based. So we also report those instances as their own
category below.

176 We found the following totals from each smaller corpus: Evans (52), Founders (41), and Hein
(130). We coded all but four of the Evans results, one of the Founders results, and fourteen of the
Hein results because those excluded instances were either quoting the Constitution or not readable.
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Figure 14: Natural Born Sense Distribution by Corpus with Leaners
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The addition of the leaners paints a picture that is still high in
indeterminacy. But the location-based sense of natural born—one gets naturalborn status by where they are born rather than who they are born to (with the
exception of the children of ambassadors born abroad)—appears to be the
most common sense when indeterminacy is ignored. Again, this greater
frequency of the location-based sense is more prominent in more ordinary
contexts—Evans and even the Founders Corpus—and less so in the legal
context. It’s unclear what this means. Perhaps an ordinary American at the
Founding would have been more likely to understand natural born in the
location-based sense, whereas an American lawyer from that same period
would have seen the meaning as less clear, or at least would have taken a more
nuanced view of the meaning of the clause. Natural born is a good example of
the limits of corpus analysis. Sometimes it does not yield clear answers. That
can be a function of the data, the ability of the tools to actually answer the
question, or both. Here, given the high percentage of indeterminate results,
we are not confident declaring the most likely communicative content of
natural born in the Constitution. Other originalist methods need to be
brought to bear on this question.
V. CONTRIBUTIONS AND CAVEATS
We have no hesitation in advocating the use of corpus linguistic analysis
as a central element of the first stage of any inquiry into the original
communicative content of the Constitution. Our traditional tools fall short
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to some degree. And data-driven originalism—of some form and to some
degree—is an essential response.
That said, the application of this linguistic tool is in its infancy. Numerous
questions remain as to how and when to implement this data-driven inquiry.
In the paragraphs below, we first highlight the unique contributions that
flow from corpus linguistic analysis of original meaning. Then we
acknowledge some caveats—limitations inherent in this tool as applied to
originalist questions—and begin the task of mapping out possible responses
to the caveats as we see them.
A. Contributions
We see three unique contributions stemming from the use of corpus
linguistic analysis of the original communicative content of the Constitution.
Corpus analysis (1) addresses shortcomings of traditional methods of inquiry
into communicative content (dictionaries and small, nonrandom samples of
usage); (2) sharpens the debate over when and how to resolve ambiguity in
original meaning; and (3) facilitates the (up to now mostly unexplored)
debate over whether and to what extent the Constitution is written in
ordinary English or in the distinct dialect of the law.
1. Corpus Analysis Addresses Shortcomings of Traditional Inquiries
Traditional tools for measuring original communicative content fall short
in the various respects highlighted above. Dictionaries do not consider
sufficient semantic context, cannot tell us which of the various senses of a
given term is more ordinary, and are usually not calibrated to the relevant
timeframe. And the use of linguistic intuition—as confirmed by a handful of
sample sentences from founding-era documents—may be the product of
motivated reasoning and cherry-picking and is not transparent or falsifiable.
A principal contribution of corpus linguistic analysis is its ability to
overcome these deficiencies. The point is most easily made by reference to
the domestic violence example. As noted above, we can now point to data that
show that the phrase domestic violence was used almost exclusively to refer to
an insurrection or rebellion, and never as a reference to household assault.
We can present that data in a systematic, transparent way that provides some
assurance that we are not cherry-picking isolated examples in a motivated
attempt to get at a preferred outcome.177 And, importantly, we can preserve

177 See also Strang, supra note 85, at 1213 (arguing that one of the biggest pay-offs to originalists
using corpus linguistics is that it allows for a culture of scholarship where the participants make
claims that other scholars can review and then affirm or rebut).
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our dataset (and methodology of assembling it) in a manner that invites
replication and falsification by anyone wishing to question our analysis.
These features have never been available using traditional originalist
methods. Existing methods either suffer from the many shortcomings of the
dictionary or open themselves up to concerns of motivated reasoning or
cherry-picking. Corpus linguistic analysis is an essential step in overcoming
these problems. It sharpens the debate at the threshold inquiry into the
“standard picture” for interpretation. It thereby establishes common ground
for discussion on the basis of transparent data that is subject to falsification.
This is an important move. It is an significant improvement over a world in
which each side picks its preferred dictionary definitions or sample sentences
and then insists it has the better of the argument.
2. Corpus Analysis Sharpens the Debate Over When and How to Resolve
Ambiguity in Original Meaning.
Corpus linguistics can also help sharpen points of debate among
subtheories of originalism. One key point of disagreement in this field is over
how to deal with the problem of ambiguity (or vagueness or other forms of
underdeterminacy). Some originalists posit the existence of a “construction
zone” that opens up upon a determination of ambiguity—a zone that no
longer is dependent on the inquiry into original communicative content, but
that instead can take account of any of a range of policy grounds for
establishing rules or standards of constitutional law.178 Others propose to
close the gap of ambiguity in other ways—by resort to “original methods” of
interpretation179 or by application of a presumption of constitutionality (or in
other words a heavy burden of proof for claims of unconstitutionality).180

178 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 65, at 72 (“If construction is inevitable because the information
contained in the text runs out before we have enough information [sic] resolve a case or controversy,
then originalists need to debate not only the appropriate approach to constitutional interpretation
but also the appropriate approach to construction. Some may wish to avoid this normative
discussion, but cases still need to be decided.”).
179 See generally McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 25, at 751 (“Under [the original methods]
approach, the Constitution should be interpreted using the interpretative methods that the
constitutional enactors would have deemed applicable to it.”).
180 See SEGALL, supra note 12, at 235 (noting that “some of the Original Originalists such as
Raoul Berger and Lino Graglia” advocated for a standard of judicial review “where judges do not
invalidate state or federal laws absent clear proof that such laws contradict clear text or almost
universally accepted understandings of what the language means”); see also Michael D. Ramsey,
Beyond the Text: Justice Scalia’s Originalism in Practice, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1946 (2017)
(observing that when constitutional text would not yield answers, Justice Scalia would turn to other
methodologies, including “structural reasoning and background assumptions,” “English law
background,” and “post-ratification practice”).
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This debate has often skated over an important threshold question—of
the nature and extent of the ambiguity necessary to trigger the need for a
closure rule. Proponents of construction posit that “textual
indeterminacies”181 leave room for judges (or other governmental actors) to
step in and build out the “skyscraper” of constitutional law on top of the
“framework” dictated by its clear original meaning.182 And critics of
construction dispute the basis or need for construction, insisting that the
better means for closing the gap is through original methods of
interpretation, or a presumption of constitutionality.
Yet all participants in this debate beg the question of the nature and extent
of the ambiguity necessary to trigger the need for a closure rule. Professors
McGinnis and Rappaport helpfully acknowledge the theoretical difficulty. They
note that there is a key ambiguity “about what constitutes [the sort of]
ambiguity” necessary to open up the door to construction (or to other means of
closing the gap).183 Thus, McGinnis and Rappaport helpfully ask whether the
originalist inquiry calls for a closure rule whenever there are two plausible
original meanings but there is “stronger evidence for one over the other,” or only
when each of those two meanings “are absolutely in equipoise.”184 And they
plausibly assert that the latter sort of ambiguity seems “very unlikely” while the
former is not really an ambiguity, but a case in which the party advocating the
view with “stronger evidence” should prevail as an original matter.185
Yet no one, to date, has ventured any further into this thicket. Perhaps for
good reason: We have never had the means of measuring the extent of the
ambiguity of the communicative content of a particular provision of the
Constitution; the degree of ambiguity has always been a theoretical construct
(as with the McGinnis and Rappaport assertion that “equipoise” is “very
unlikely”). That’s no longer always the case. For at least some questions of
original meaning, we can assemble and analyze data on the degree of
ambiguity of the communicative content of the Constitution. And the data
can facilitate a more reasoned debate about the propriety and basis for the
application of a closure rule.
This point can be amplified by reference to the commerce question. As
with domestic violence, the corpus data on commerce give us a window into

181 See KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 3–9 (1999) (describing

CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS
a process whereby the political process

fills in “textual indeterminacies”).
182 See Balkin, supra note 10, at 560 (“Framework originalism leaves space for future
generations to build out and construct the Constitution-in-practice.”).
183 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 25, at 773.
184 Id. (raising this point in highlighting an unresolved question for proponents of
constitutional construction).
185 Id. at 773–74.
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details that would never be visible upon consulting a founding-era dictionary
or examining cherry-picked sentences from historical literature. Those
materials could tell us that the various senses of commerce (trade, production,
all economic activity, or all intercourse) are linguistically possible; but they
could never give us empirical data on the relative frequency of these senses
in the relevant time period. We can now consider hard data on that
question—assembled in a systematic, transparent manner that is subject to
falsification. And that data, at least arguably, tells us that the original meaning
of commerce is the trade sense of the term.
Thus far we are just reiterating the principal contribution of corpus
linguistics in Part V.A.1. above, as applied to commerce. But the arguably caveat
goes to the second contribution we are highlighting here. Corpus linguistics
can give us data on the extent of the ambiguity in the communicative content
of the Commerce Clause. And that data can sharpen the debate over the
propriety and basis for a closure rule (like construction or resort to an original
legal rule of interpretation). The data on commerce show that the trade sense
of the term appears overwhelmingly more frequently than the other proffered
senses of the term. But they also reveal numerous uses of the term that we
were unable to code—and thus that could conceivably represent an alternative
sense of the term (production, all economic activity, or all intercourse). That
suggests some degree of ambiguity—but nothing approaching “equipoise.”
This can help to sharpen the debate about what to do next. With data
about the degree of ambiguity, we can have a more structured debate about
how to deal with it. One response might be to say that there is no real
ambiguity here, and thus no need for a closure rule (like construction). If all
the determinate semantic data available point in favor of the “trade” notion
of commerce, then we could plausibly conclude that our best attempt at
understanding the original communicative content of this clause leads us to
this narrow understanding. And that could be the end of the matter—cutting
off the need for construction or any other sort of closure rule.
But that is not the only possibility (and our point here is not to suggest a
single answer from the corpus data, but only to highlight the ways in which
the data can sharpen the debate). Another possible response could be to
highlight the number of concordance lines that were deemed indeterminate
or uncodable. Because there is a relatively large number of lines that fall in
that category for commerce, one could argue that there is sufficient ambiguity
to open the door for further analysis.
The point here is to note that McGinnis and Rappaport probably
oversimplified when they suggested the possibility of either “equipoise” or a
confident conclusion that the originalist case for one construction over
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another is clearly “stronger.”186 There may be other cases where the “standard
picture”—the view of communicative content—is simply unclear. And corpus
data can help define the degree of ambiguity.
We take no position here on whether the number of indeterminate
concordance lines for commerce is sufficient to establish ambiguity. But we
note the possibility as a step to highlight what we see as a decision tree for a
problem like this one. If and when the originalist inquiry leads to an
ambiguity deemed sufficient to proceed beyond the first-order inquiry into
corpus linguistic data, the next question is how to resolve it. For a problem
like commerce, where most of the determinate concordance lines line up with
the “trade” sense but many other concordance lines are indeterminate, the
next step could be to look for other means of closing the gap.
One such means could be to parse the corpus databases further—in a
manner that might resolve the ambiguity in favor of original intent. On commerce
we could point to a difference in the data among the various corpora: The
“trade” sense of commerce is even more predominately evident in the Founders
corpus (seventy-four percent), and fewer of the concordance lines in this corpus
were deemed indeterminate (twenty-six percent). Perhaps that could be
enough to resolve any ambiguity. That conclusion could be a fairly comfortable
one for the original-intent originalist. But we see no reason to foreclose this
approach even for the original public-meaning originalist. The latter is
principally interested in deriving the meaning that would have been evident to
the public; but in a case of some doubt about that meaning, the doubt could be
resolved in favor of the presumed understanding of the public about the
intentions of the framers or ratifiers.187
An alternative would be to look to other originalist means of resolving the
ambiguity. Perhaps “immersion” in “texts from the relevant period” would let
judges resolve apparent indeterminacies in the corpus.188 Or perhaps a careful
study of the “constitutional record”—of “precursor provisions and proposals,”
drafting history, ratification debates, early historical practice, and early

Id. at 773.
See Solum, supra note 1, at 490-91 (arguing that “the speaker must know what the audience
knows about the speaker’s intentions and vice versa [and] so long as the author of the text and the
reader of the text could satisfy the conditions for common knowledge of the author’s beliefs
regarding audience recognition of the author’s intentions . . . the ‘author’s meaning’ of a text would
be the uptake that the author intended to produce in the reader on the basis of the reader’s
recognition of the author’s intention” (emphasis added)); see also Solum, Originalist Methodology,
supra note 19, at 277 (“The communicative content of a writing is the content the author intended to
convey to the reader via the audience’s recognition of the author’s communicative intention.”
(emphasis omitted)).
188 Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 16, at 1649.
186
187
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judicial decisions—would help remove any remaining ambiguities and paint
a sufficiently clear picture.189
If not, we could then have a more informed debate about the propriety of
and basis for a closure rule—of a practice of judicial construction, or of
resolving any remaining doubt by application of an originalist tool of
interpretation (like a canon or a presumption of constitutionality).
Our point, again, is not to advocate for a single orthodoxy in approaching
these problems. It is to highlight the contribution that corpus linguistic
analysis makes for these kinds of questions—in helping to quantify the nature
or extent of ambiguity in the communicative content of the Constitution, and
thus to set the stage for a more informed debate about the propriety and basis
for construction or some other closure rule.
3. Corpus Analysis Facilitates the Debate on Whether the Constitution is
Written in Ordinary English or in the Dialect of the Law
Corpus linguistics can also help sharpen another debate among competing
sub-theories of originalism. A key question at the intersection of publicmeaning originalism and methods originalism concerns the degree to which
the Constitution is written in ordinary English or in a distinct dialect—the
language of the law. Both sides agree that both dialects are present. But
neither has offered a reasoned basis for drawing the distinction as to specific
clauses. Instead the discussion is marked by gestalt linguistic intuition—with
McGinnis and Rappaport listing some clauses of the Constitution they
believe to be distinctly legal, others they see as having both a legal meaning
and an ordinary meaning, and a third category of terms that “possibly have a
legal meaning in addition to their ordinary meaning.”190
This question is a pivotal one for the originalist inquiry into original
communicative content. To the extent the Constitution is written in the
language of the law, the methods originalists have a strong case for closing
the gap on any apparent ambiguity by resorting to the shared communicative
conventions used within the dialect of “legalese” (canons of construction and
the like). Yet no one has proposed a means for identifying the terms in the
Constitution that are written in this dialect.
Corpus linguistics can fill this void. A first step, as we have noted, is to
compare the frequency of usage of a given term in legal documents to the
frequency of the same term in nonlegal documents. To the extent a given term
is used much more frequently in legal documents we can reason that it may
be a legal term of art. We say may because we do not see frequency data as
189
190

Id. at 1655.
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 25, at 1374.

326

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 261

dispositive. Certain ordinary terms may be used more frequently in legal
materials but not have a distinctive meaning in a legal dialect. Words like
testimony or lawyer or verdict may be examples. Those terms presumably are
used in the same sense in ordinary parlance even though they occur more
frequently in the dialect of the law.
But other terms may develop a distinct meaning in law. And a more
probing use of corpus analysis can help suss that out. To evaluate whether a
term is used in a distinct sense in the law, we would need to code and compare
senses of the term in concordance lines in both a legal and an ordinary English
corpus. If the sense of the term is distinct in the legal corpus, then we may
discern that the term has a distinct meaning in the law.
Our corpus analysis in Part IV sheds some light on the usage of public use
and natural born citizen. Both of these terms appear much more frequently in
the legal corpus than in the Evans (ordinary English) corpus. That is a prima
facie indication that these may be legal terms of art. Drilling further, we can
see that public use seems to have a distinct meaning in legal parlance: At a
minimum, we can say that the “direct” sense of public use appears more
frequently in the legal corpus (78.2%) than in the corpus of ordinary English
(61.4%), while the “indirect” sense appears relatively more frequently in
ordinary parlance (10.8%) than in legal terminology (0.8%). That’s an
indication that public use may have a distinct meaning in law (subject to the
caveat presented in subsection IV.B.2 below). If those numbers were more
distinct, such as the direct sense consisting of ninety percent of the senses of
public use in the legal corpus but only twenty percent in the corpus of ordinary
English, then we would be even more confident that the direct sense was a
legal term of art.
The natural born citizen data is more difficult to decode. Again, we see that
this phrase appears more frequently in the legal corpus. But that doesn’t
necessarily mean that this phrase has a distinct meaning in law. Here, as
noted, the data are mostly indeterminate; for the most part we just can’t tell
whether instances of natural born citizen contemplate location-based, parentbased, or legislative-bestowal notions of this term. The location-based notion
appears more prominently in the Evans corpus. But we see no reason to
believe that this is a distinct meaning of this phrase in ordinary parlance
(different from the meaning of the phrase in legal parlance). Instead, it
appears that all three of the competing senses are legal senses. And that renders
the debate on legalese versus ordinary language moot.
That tees up a response to the McGinnis and Rappaport formulation of
the categories of terms in the Constitution. McGinnis and Rappaport suggest
three categories of constitutional terms: those that are “unambiguously legal,”
those that are “ambiguous” (presumably in the sense of having both legal and
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ordinary meaning), and those that seem to have “a legal meaning in addition
to their ordinary meaning.” Our data and analysis suggest a different way to
conceptualize the relevant categories. If a given term is used only in the legal
lexicon, or in other words in only a legal sense, then presumably any inquiry
into communicative content will lead to the same place. Consider the examples
identified by McGinnis and Rappaport for this category: habeas corpus, original
jurisdiction, and attainder of treason. Any attempt to discern the meaning of
these terms would lead to the same conclusion. If these are purely legal terms
with meaning only in the dialect of the law, then it won’t matter where we go
looking for evidence of its meaning (in a legal corpus or an ordinary one). The
other categories are in this sense more important. The question whether the
Constitution is using terms in a legal or ordinary sense matters only if a term
bears meaning in both dialects—and only if that meaning differs across the
dialects. This suggests that the point of debate between methods originalism
and public-meaning originalism requires careful parsing of the terms of the
Constitution as it appears in distinct corpora. And it highlights the need for
corpus analysis to further the debate, as no other tool is capable of sussing out
the distinction contemplated by this debate.
B. Caveats
The above highlights originalist questions that corpus linguistics is
uniquely suited to answer. Here we enumerate some caveats in this use of the
tool. Our caveats go to the range of questions for which corpus analysis seems
to lend itself: the question of what to do when the data are indeterminate,
and the question whether judges are capable of corpus linguistic analysis.
1. Scope of Applicability of Corpus Linguistic Analysis
A threshold question for corpus-based originalism concerns the scope of its
applicability. We began this Article by reference to the “standard picture” of
constitutional interpretation—a view of the communicative content of the words
of the Constitution. And we have highlighted what we see as shortcomings of
traditional methods of assessing that content while emphasizing the promise that
corpus linguistics holds for addressing these concerns.
But we need to mention an important caveat: The constitutional questions
we have highlighted in this Article do not run the gamut of the range of
problems of indeterminacy in the communicative content of the
Constitution. The questions we propose to analyze using corpus data are
problems of lexical ambiguity—ambiguity in the form of a contest between
two alternative senses of a constitutional term. All the problems we discuss
here—the meaning of domestic violence, commerce, public use, and natural born
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citizen—are all ambiguities of this sort. We chose these examples for good
reason. Corpus analysis, to date, has been applied most comfortably to these
types of problems.191 And that has been our focus here.
Yet of course this is not the only kind of indeterminacy that appears in
the Constitution. The document also has examples of semantic or structural
ambiguity192—ambiguity stemming from the semantic structure of the words
(as opposed to competing senses of the terms). An example is the “well
regulated Militia” clause in the Second Amendment. A key point of
ambiguity here is semantic or structural—whether the “well regulated
Militia” clause modifies or somehow limits the right to bear arms, or is instead
merely prefatory.193 Corpus analysis—or at least the methods we present in
this Article—may not be of obvious use to this kind of problem.194
That’s not to say that corpus analysis is clearly unhelpful for this kind of
ambiguity. More thought and analysis are needed. But the cited Second
Amendment problem presumably could benefit from some form of corpus
analysis.195 If the question is whether prefatory clauses in law are viewed as
capable of limiting an operative provision, then an extensive analysis of a legal
corpus might be just the tool that is needed. We have not tried this inquiry
and are not in a position to opine on its viability. But we see no reason to
foreclose the possibility of this kind of analysis. If a legal corpus includes
sufficient examples of prefatory clauses, and enough linguistic information to
let a careful reader discern how the clause is understood as applied to
operative provisions, then corpus linguistics could also be extended to this
sort of problem of semantic ambiguity.

191 See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 88, at 871 (noting that corpus linguistics, “as currently
conceived,” has been comfortably extended only to problems of “lexical ambiguity”).
192 Id. at 872 n.318 (explaining that “syntactic ambiguities arise from the possibility of
alternative constituent structures”; giving the example of “Mary saw the man with the telescope,” while
noting that “with the telescope is either a manner adverbial modifying saw, or a prepositional phrase
modifying the man”).
193 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 25, at 767 (discussing this question and defending
the decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), on the ground that “the law at the
time of the Constitution’s enactment had an accepted interpretive canon that clarified the issue”—
a canon that “held that a prefatory clause could resolve an ambiguity, but could not otherwise limit
or expand the operative clause”).
194 See Phillips & White, supra note 58, at 185, 233-34 (concluding that corpus linguistic analysis
cannot determine the meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause because of the structural
ambiguity introduced by the phrase “of any kind whatever”).
195 See Josh Blackman & James C. Phillips, Corpus Linguistics and the Second Amendment, HARV. L. REV.
BLOG (Aug. 7, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/corpus-linguistics-and-the-second-amendment/.
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2. Indeterminate Data
A second question concerns the problem of indeterminate data. We see two
potential sources of indeterminacy. The first is the more obvious—indeterminacy
in the data mined from the relevant corpus. This is featured most prominently in
the natural born citizen analysis above. We are hesitant to make an inference from
the corpus data on natural born citizen because so many of the concordance lines
that we coded were ultimately indeterminate. That problem is surely not unique
to this clause of the Constitution. And the existence of indeterminate data will be
a hurdle for other problems of constitutional interpretation.
Yet this is not the only source of indeterminacy in the use of corpus-based
originalism. Another is inherent in lexicography—in the division of senses in
the dictionary. The division among senses of a given term is at some level
arbitrary. Clearly there’s a great deal of subjectivity in the way that senses are
divided.196 Linguists have no agreed-upon formula for distinguishing senses
of a word.197 That means that our identification of a relevant set of senses will
in some sense be arbitrary. And that complicates the attempt to derive useful
information from the corpus data.198
That’s one reason why the domestic violence example seems to lend itself so
well to corpus analysis. The insurrection and household assault senses of this
phrase are sufficiently distinct that it is fairly easy to offer confident
conclusions from the data that we compiled. If one clearly distinct sense of a
constitutional term is used overwhelmingly more frequently in the corpus, we
can say fairly confidently that that is the communicative content of the term.

196 Nikola Dobric, Word Sense Disambiguation Using ID Tags—Identifying Meaning in Polysemous
Words in English, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LEXIS AND
GRAMMAR/LGC 97, 97 (Dusko Vitas & Cvetana Krstev eds., 2010) (explaining that polysemy—
multiple word meaning—is “[o]ne of the persisting issues in modern lexicography”).
197 No one is quite sure where to draw the line—research “show[s] that different polysemy
criteria (i.e., criteria that may be invoked to establish that a particular interpretation of a lexical item
constitutes a separate sense rather than just being a case of vagueness or generality) may be mutually
contradictory, or may each yield different results in different contexts.” DIRK GEERAERTS,
THEORIES OF LEXICAL SEMANTICS 196 (2009). And there is no agreed-upon taxonomy of
polysemy; some linguists speak of senses and sub-senses, see Dylan Glynn, Polysemy and Synonymy:
Cognitive Theory and Corpus Method, in CORPUS METHODS FOR SEMANTICS: QUANTITATIVE
STUDIES IN POLYSEMY AND SYNONYMY 7, 17 (Dylan Glynn & Justyna A. Robinson eds., 2014),
others of more or less prototypical exemplars of senses, see, e.g., Dagmar Divjak & Antti Arppe,
Extracting Prototypes from Exemplars: What Can Corpus Data Tell Us About Concept Representation?, 24
COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 221 (2013), and others of hyponomy and hypernomy in polysemy, see
Glynn, supra, at 10.
198 See James Cleith Phillips, Jacob Crump, & Benjamin Lee, Investigating the Original Meaning
of “Officers of the United States” with the Corpus of Founding-Era American English, 37
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3126975 (struggling to classify various senses of
officer, and instead, among other things, looking at specific officers mentioned to get an idea of the
scope of the word).
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But other sense distinctions will be less clear. And difficult problems arise
when the competing senses are closely related to each other—as where one is
a more general sense encompassing the other. This seems to be the case for
the two senses of public use. We refer to one sense as direct and the other
indirect. But the indirect notion of public use can be thought of as the general
category (benefit to the public), of which the direct notion (the government
owning or directly employing) can be viewed as a specific example. And if
that is the right way to think of this relationship, then it is difficult to know
what to do with a predominance of direct uses of public use in the corpus.
Does that tell us that the original communicative content of the public use
proviso of the Takings Clause is a direct notion of use? Or does it suggest that
the indirect notion should also be included, in that the direct notion
encompasses the indirect one?
These are difficult questions to answer. And they are another ground for
a degree of hesitation in touting corpus linguistics as the answer to all
originalist inquiries.
That said, this does not diminish the significance of the contribution of
corpus-based originalism. At a minimum, the move to data-driven analysis
can remedy shortcomings in existing tools for finding original communicative
content. With systematic data instead of cherry-picked sample sentences, we
can have a more informed debate about the likely understanding of a given
term or phrase in the founding era. Some such terms (like domestic violence)
will yield clear data on distinctly separate senses of the operative language.
And where that occurs, the inquiry into original communicative content may
end with corpus linguistic analysis.
That will not always be the case, of course. But even where the data are
inconclusive, the contribution of corpus linguistics will be significant. In some
cases, corpus analysis will just be the first step on the originalist inquiry. If the
data are inconclusive, that can tell us that we need to look elsewhere to find an
answer—to an original method of interpretation, to evidence of founders’ or
ratifiers’ intent, or to a decision to open the door to a “construction zone.”
This in itself is a contribution of corpus linguistic analysis. Our existing tools
of interpretation make wild, opaque guesses about when the “standard picture”
is fuzzy enough to open the door to the above and other closure rules. Corpus
linguistics, at a minimum, can put some meat on the bones of the question
whether the original communicative content of a given term is sufficiently
ambiguous to call for construction or some other means of resolution.
The degree of indeterminacy may itself be helpful in the originalist
inquiry—depending on your chosen theory. A high degree of indeterminacy,
for example, could properly sustain the invocation of a presumption of
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constitutionality under a Thayerian burden of proof.199 And corpus
linguistics, unlike any other tool of originalist inquiry, can help quantify the
degree of clarity in the communicative content of a given provision. This
itself is an important advancement. And it’s an advancement that stands
despite the caveats set forth here.
The question of when corpus linguistic analysis is enough (and when more
research will be needed) is a difficult one. But we propose a threshold
decisional rubric. An originalist inquiry into original communicative content
should begin with two questions, each going to the conclusiveness of the
corpus data. If the answer to either question is no, that suggests that some
other originalist methodology or closure rule is likely needed.
1. The first question is whether the corpus data points clearly in favor
of a predominant sense of the constitutional term.
2. The second is whether the senses of the term are sufficiently distinct
from each other to treat them as separate.
We would answer yes to both of those questions for our domestic violence
analysis—and thus propose to end the originalist inquiry there. For commerce,
we would answer yes to the first and no to the second question. That at least
arguably opens the door to further originalist analysis. The same holds for
public use (though the answer to the first question is even closer). And for
natural born we probably do not even get to the second question because the
answer to the first appears to be no. Granted, what is “sufficiently clear” and
what is “sufficiently distinct” can be debated and will have to be fleshed out.
But that’s a better debate to have than previous ones we’ve been having with
traditional originalist methodology.
3. Judicial Capacity for Corpus Linguistic Analysis
A familiar critique of any originalist inquiry challenges the capacity of
judges to do justice to the enterprise. Judges are not historians. It may rightly
be said that many judges are even “bad historians” who tend to “make up an
imaginary history and use curiously unhistorical methods.”200 This is
sometimes cited as a reason to eschew originalism. If judges are incapable of
conducting a reliable originalist inquiry, perhaps they shouldn’t try.
If that critique sticks (and we think it can’t, for reasons explained below),
then the problem is perhaps compounded as applied to data-driven
originalism. Judges are also not corpus linguists. And it may be unrealistic to

199 See Segall, supra note 12, at 28–40 (discussing founding-era practices of and views on judicial
review, including Alexander Hamilton’s famous “irreconcilable variance” standard and St. George
Tucker’s “absolutely and irreconcilably contradictory” standard of judicial review).
200 MAX RADIN, LAW AS LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE 138 (1940).
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expect them to acquire the expertise and proficiency needed to perform the
corpus-based analysis that we propose here.201
This is a caveat worth noting. “Corpus data can be gathered and analyzed
properly only with care and a little background and training in the underlying
methodology.”202 Further, “[a] judge who proceeds willy-nilly may, either
consciously or unwittingly, proffer data that has only the appearance of careful
empiricism.”203 And for these reasons, we share the hesitation set forth here.
We agree that judges will be aided by expert analysis and full adversary
briefing. And we think judges and lawyers going forward will benefit from a
little training in the use of corpus-based methods of inquiry.
But again the caveat does not defeat the importance of this project. “The
fact of the matter is that judges and lawyers are linguists.”204 That’s true in
the sense that we are consistently called upon to resolve ambiguities in the
language of the law. And we think that is the principal response to this final
caveat. “[T]he question, ultimately, is not whether we trust judges to engage
in linguistic analysis. It is whether we want them to ‘do so with the aid of—
instead of in open ignorance of or rebellion to—modern tools developed to
facilitate that analysis.”205 The tools, moreover, are not ultimately that
complex or difficult. “Corpus analysis is like math”206—everyone can do it at
some basic level, while more advanced inquiries will require some real
expertise. Much corpus analysis is fairly rudimentary. We “just think we
should be using a calculator instead of doing it in our heads.”207
In time, the law and corpus linguistics movement will develop standards
and best practices for this field. And budding generations of lawyers will learn
to employ the tools of corpus linguistics in tackling a wide range of problems
of ambiguity in the law. Until then, we should proceed cautiously and
carefully. However, we cannot afford to ignore this important tool. We may
not be expert linguists or even historians. Yet for those of us who think of
constitutional interpretation as we do (as an historical exercise), we can do no

201 This point has been raised by a majority of the Utah Supreme Court, in opinions criticizing
the proposed use (by one of us) of corpus linguistics as applied to problems of statutory
interpretation. See State v. Rasabout, 356 P.2d 1258, 1265 (Utah 2015) (asserting that “[t]he
knowledge and expertise required” to perform this kind of analysis is “‘not within the common
knowledge’ of judges” and thus requires testimony from expert witnesses).
202 Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 88, at 866 (making this point as applied to problems of
statutory interpretation).
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 866-67.
206 Rasabout, 356 P.2d at 1236 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(making this point in proposing the use of corpus linguistics in a case involving statutory
interpretation).
207 Id.
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better than to close by quoting Justice Scalia and his co-author Bryan Garner:
“Our charge is to try.”208
CONCLUSION: CONSTRAINT THROUGH DATA-DRIVEN ORIGINALISM
Some originalists have begun to question a founding tenet of the
originalist enterprise—the idea that this approach to interpretation
“constrains” judicial discretion.209 Perhaps it’s true that originalism, as often
conceived, is not the most constraining theory of interpretation that we can
imagine.210 But concerns about the demise of this premise—constraint—are
surely exaggerated. And we think the theory and methodology of this Article
can help to show why.
Will Baude suggests that “there are . . . probably methodologies that
are . . . better at” imposing “external constraint” on judges.211 The examples
he gives are “heavy deference to other branches or strong stare decisis.”212 But
these aren’t freestanding theories of interpretation. No one believes in always
deferring to other branches of government on constitutional matters. And
even an ironclad rule of deference to precedent leaves new constitutional
questions not resolved by precedent. So to get to the theories that Baude
imagines to be more constraining you would have to start with a threshold
theory—a theory for discerning the bedrock foundation of the Constitution
that other branches of government are held to, or that tells you what to do
when you have no controlling precedent.
That leaves us with either originalism or some form of anti-originalism
like pragmatism. And originalism is easily more constraining than some freeform notion of pragmatism.213 Constraint, moreover, is more than just precise
determinacy—the identification of a single right answer that everyone would
agree on.214 The originalist inquiry, at a minimum, reduces the breadth of a
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 13, at 400.
See Baude, supra note 7, at 2215 (suggesting that proponents of the “constraint” premise of
originalism “no longer have a clear champion”); Colby, supra note 7, at 714-15 (2011) (asserting that
“[j]udicial constraint” was once the “heart and soul” of originalism but that originalism has since
“sold its soul to gain respect and adherents”).
210 See Baude, supra note 7, at 2223 (suggesting that “theories centered around heavy deference to
other branches or strong stare decisis . . . could make it easier to judge the judiciary’s behavior, because
it is comparatively transparent when a law is being struck down or a precedent is being overruled”).
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 See id. (explaining that originalism “compares favorably to ‘pragmatism’—under which it’s
wickedly difficult to tell whether its practitioners are doing it right or wrong”); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2062 (2006) (“The
existence of reasonably firm criteria [in originalism] makes it easier to check up on originalist
interpretations for the soundness of their reasoning and their adherence to correct principles.”).
214 See Christopher R. Green, Constitutional Truthmakers, NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y (forthcoming) (manuscript at 18) (on file with authors) (noting that originalism may fail “to
208
209
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judge’s discretion.215 And it yields at least “internal constraints”—in allowing
“individual interpreters to come up with their own best assessments of
constitutional meaning.”216 This sort of constraint may not “easily yield
consensus or rule most interpretations out of bounds as implausible”; yet
originalism can “still provide a method that can be divorced from various
nonlegal considerations.”217 And corpus linguistics, in our view, can help to
discipline all the foregoing mechanisms of constraint.
Corpus analysis may yield data-backed grounds for more points of clear
“consensus” in the communicative content of the Constitution. And it may
let us more clearly rule out more interpretations of the document as
“implausible.” The tool, at a minimum, gives us the ability to assemble
empirical support for conclusions along these lines. And where we have such
data we may have a solid basis for an external constraint on judges.
The domestic violence example illustrates the point. Without the data we present
herein a judge could plausibly contend that the original meaning of the Domestic
Violence Clause could be understood to encompass problems of household assault.
Through dictionary analysis or otherwise, a degree of doubt could be cast on the
view that there is only one clear way to understand domestic violence, or that the
household assault sense of the term is untenably implausible. But the corpus data
rules that out. We now know that the Domestic Violence Clause is limited to acts
of insurrection. And we can point to originalism as a basis for an external constraint
on a judge who is inclined to rule otherwise.
The commerce data is less constraining. But it is somewhat constraining.
For reasons noted above we may not be able to say conclusively that the
founding-era notion of commerce is clearly limited to the trade sense of the
term—too many of our concordance lines were indeterminate to be certain,
and some of the competing senses of commerce are too closely related to deem
them exclusive of others. Yet the data can still provide a degree of
constraint—and at least an internal limitation allowing interpreters to come
up with their own best sense of constitutional meaning. A judge who takes
original meaning seriously, for example, would have a very difficult time
produce unique and indisputable answers” to some constitutional questions (quoting Andrew
Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1917, 1919
(2012)).
215 See Baude, supra note 7, at 2217 (suggesting that originalism may meaningfully limit judicial
discretion without eliminating it); Colby, supra note 7, at 751 (noting that “New Originalists” posit
that originalism is “still meaningfully constraining” even if it “does not completely eliminate judicial
subjectivity”); Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of Justice
Scalia, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 917 (2016) (noting that there is “[n]o reason . . . why we cannot
conclude for ourselves that one side has the better of” the originalist argument, “even if by a nose,
and even while admitting that a disagreeing colleague could see it the other way”).
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justifying a production sense of commerce in light of our data. The allintercourse sense is almost equally implausible. What about the economic
activity sense? Perhaps that could not be rejected outright as utterly untenable
(for reasons we noted). But the data would provide a basis for choosing the
trade sense of commerce over the others. And that basis could yield at least
internal constraint in the sense noted above—of giving the judge a method
“divorced from nonlegal considerations” for deciding the case. The
transparency of the methodology, moreover, means that others can more
easily check a judge’s conclusions from the data. That also provides an
internal check to the judge, who will have an incentive to be more careful with
his methodology and conclusions.
Corpus analysis is useful—and in a sense constraining—even to the extent
it leaves a given question of original meaning indeterminate. The data, at a
minimum, can tell us when we cannot be sure of the original communicative
content of a provision of the Constitution. And that in itself is useful. It will
cue up further steps in an originalist decision tree—as to the invocation of
any of a series of closure rules (in opening the construction zone, employing
a presumption of constitutionality, or turning to original methods of
interpretation). These methods themselves may not always lead to a single
answer of universal acclaim. But they will at least narrow the bounds of
debate. And the data will have been the first step in getting there.
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